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TAKINGS AND EXTORTION
Daniel P. Selmi* **
Abstract
The Supreme Court has repeatedly employed an extortion narrative in
deciding when governmental actions imposing exactions on development
projects constitute takings under the Fifth Amendment. In that narrative,
local officials act in ever-present bad faith by misusing their regulatory
powers to coerce concessions by developers seeking land use approvals.
While the extortion narrative has received little attention, it operates as
an explanatory device for understanding the Court’s takings
jurisprudence in the exactions field. The narrative has justified the
expansion of exactions takings law beyond real property, substantially
altered the deference normally accorded by the Court to local government
actions, and allowed the Court to extend takings analysis into predecision bargaining. The concept may well lead the Court to further
expand the scope of takings.
This Article analyzes the extortion narrative and concludes that it
cannot support these changes in takings law. Not only is the narrative
based on assumed facts, the factual context of land use exactions does not
fit within the legal concept of extortion. Furthermore, use of the term
devalues the constitutional status of locally elected officials while
altering the function of the Takings Clause from determining when
compensation is required to prophylactically preventing local
government abuses by monitoring local government decision-making
processes. In doing so, this Article concludes, the Court’s decisions
employing the extortion narrative have departed from the actual language
of the Fifth Amendment and intruded into the protections provided by a
separate constitutional provision, the Due Process Clause.
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INTRODUCTION
In developing the law of regulatory takings under the Fifth
Amendment, the U.S. Supreme Court has sought to instill doctrinal rigor
into a notoriously vague area of law and to curb what it sees as
governmental excesses. Much of the Court’s work has focused on
establishing firm boundaries that identify when exactions requiring
developers to dedicate land or pay fees to local governments amount to
takings.1 In a series of decisions,2 the Court seemed to make some
headway, even though it did not end the debate over how much authority
governments should possess. Those decisions featured a two-part test for
1. Although “exactions” sometimes refers only to requirements that a developer pay fees,
and not to requirements that the developer dedicate land, this Article uses the word to encompass
both. See, e.g., Vicki Been, Impact Fees and Housing Affordability, 8 CITYSCAPE 139, 141 (2005)
(clearing up terminological confusion by explaining that exactions are requirements for
dedications, fees, impact fees, and linkage fees); Julie A. Tappendorf & Matthew T. DiCianni,
The Big Chill?—The Likely Impact of Koontz on the Local Government/Developer Relationship,
30 TOURO L. REV. 455, 458 (2014) (“An exaction is a condition placed on land by the government
that requires a property owner seeking to develop his property to mitigate the negative impacts of
the owner’s proposed development. This often requires the developer to dedicate land . . . or to
pay money . . . .” (footnotes omitted)).
2. See, e.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 548 (2005); Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
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determining when exactions amount to takings.3 The quest for doctrinal
certainty reached a high-water mark in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.,4 a
unanimous 2005 opinion in which Justice Sandra Day O’Connor
attempted to rationalize the Court’s takings decisions into a cohesive
framework.5
However, a 2013 decision, Koontz v. St. Johns River Water
Management District,6 upset that relative doctrinal stability. The Court
ruled that in negotiating with a land developer over a development
approval, the St. Johns River Water Management District had violated
the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions by demanding exactions that
would have constituted takings had the agency actually imposed them.7
The Court also held that the doctrine encompasses at least some exactions
of money as well as of real property.8 The opinion immediately sparked
a vigorous academic debate over the effect of Koontz on the takings
doctrine and its consistency with the Court’s earlier takings decisions on
exactions.9 Much of the reaction was negative. Particularly puzzling was
the fact that the Court found a violation of the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine, even though the governmental agency had not actually imposed
any exactions, because it disapproved of the developer’s project.10
This Article proposes an explanatory perspective for the Court’s
recent takings cases on exactions. It identifies a continuing judicial
narrative that underlies those cases and then examines the cases in light
of it. This narrative sees local governments not as acting in good faith in
the public interest, but as fixed on extorting concessions out of
developers. It is a narrative of unbridled governmental coercion and,
consequently, of extreme judicial distrust of local governments.
3. The Court must determine (1) whether an “essential nexus” exists between a legitimate
state interest and the permit condition exacted by the city (Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837) and, if that
nexus exists, (2) whether the condition is roughly proportional to the extent of the impact
generated by the development (Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391).
4. 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
5. See id. at 547–48.
6. 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2602 (2013).
7. Id. at 2595 (“Extortionate demands of this sort frustrate the Fifth Amendment right to
just compensation, and the unconstitutional conditions doctrine prohibits them.”).
8. Id. at 2599.
9. See, e.g., John D. Echeverria, Koontz: The Very Worst Takings Decision Ever?, 22
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 2–3 (2014); Lee Anne Fennell & Eduardo M. Peñalver, Exactions Creep,
2013 SUP. CT. REV. 287, 288; Mark Fenster, Substantive Due Process by Another Name: Koontz,
Exactions, and the Regulatory Takings Doctrine, 30 TOURO L. REV. 403, 404 (2014) [hereinafter
Fenster, Substantive Due Process]; Robert H. Freilich & Neil M. Popowitz, How Local
Governments Can Resolve Koontz’s Prohibitions on Ad Hoc Land Use Restrictions, 45 URB.
LAW. 971, 971–72 (2013); Ilya Somin, Two Steps Forward for the “Poor Relation” of
Constitutional Law: Koontz, Arkansas Game & Fish, and the Future of the Takings Clause, 2013
CATO SUP. CT. REV. 215, 216; Tappendorf & DiCianni, supra note 1, at 456.
10. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2591, 2595.
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Viewing the Court’s decisions as reflecting this narrative, termed here
the “extortion narrative,” offers insights into the development of takings
law on exactions as it stands through Koontz. It explains inconsistencies
in the Court’s recent takings decisions on exactions and the Court’s
controversial expansion of takings law in Koontz. It also suggests
directions that the Court’s jurisprudence might well take if the narrative
continues to operate as a powerful underlying force. The analysis shows
the depth of the Court majority’s conviction in the narrative, a conviction
that led the Court to a result in Koontz that is doctrinally questionable.
Finally, this Article analyzes whether the narrative can bear the weight
that a majority of the Court has assigned to it in developing exactions law.
This Article concludes that it cannot do so for several reasons.
The analysis proceeds as follows. Part I summarizes the ascension of
the extortion narrative in the Supreme Court’s exactions case law since
1987. Part II explains the idea of judicial narratives and identifies the
features of the extortion narrative explicated in exactions case law. In Part
III, this Article analyzes how this narrative can explain and predict the
outcomes of issues that arise in the area of exaction takings. Finally, Part
IV evaluates whether the extortion narrative can offer a foundational
principle supporting the development of takings jurisprudence. It
concludes that the extortion narrative alone cannot provide that support.
I. THE RISE OF THE EXTORTION NARRATIVE
This Part traces the rise of the extortion narrative in the Supreme
Court’s takings cases on exactions since the narrative’s origin in 1987.
The discussion does not fully summarize the cases nor does it completely
explain the development of takings theory. The academic literature
contains a surfeit of articles analyzing the cases.11 Rather, this Part shows
how the Court endorsed a narrative theme of local government extortion
in imposing exactions.

11. See generally Daniel J. Curtin, Jr. & W. Andrew Gowder, Jr., Exactions Update: When
and How Do the Dolan/Nollan Rules Apply, 35 URB. LAW. 729 (2003) (analyzing rules that have
emerged from Supreme Court takings decisions); John J. Delaney, What Does It Take to Make a
Take? A Post-Dolan Look at the Evolution of Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence in the Supreme
Court, 27 URB. LAW. 55 (1995) (same); Richard Duane Faus, Exactions, Impact Fees, and
Dedications—Local Government Responses to Nollan/Dolan Takings Law Issues, 29 STETSON L.
REV. 675 (2000) (same); Daniel S. Huffenus, Dolan Meets Nollan: Towards a Workable Takings
Test for Development Exactions Cases, 4 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 30 (1995) (same); Edward J.
Sullivan, Substantive Due Process Resurrected Through the Takings Clause: Nollan, Dolan, and
Ehrlich, 25 ENVTL. L. 155 (1995) (suggesting that these decisions resurrect substantive due
process through the Takings Clause).
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A. Origins
In the mid-1960s, local governments increasingly began to impose
extensive conditions on development projects to mitigate project effects
and to pay for the cost of new infrastructure serving those projects.12
These included conditions, known as exactions, that required developers
to dedicate real property or to pay fees.13 For example, local governments
required developers to dedicate land within a development for use as
streets, school sites, or park sites, or to pay fees that funded improvements
to wastewater treatment facilities or roads.14 The purpose of these
exactions was to internalize the costs of impacts caused by the
developments, partly in response to increasing constraints on local
governments’ ability to fund infrastructure.15 State statutes sometimes
governed these exactions, and state courts increasingly faced
constitutional challenges to their imposition.16
In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,17 the first in a series of
sharply divided decisions on exactions, the Supreme Court took up the
question of whether a condition on a project requiring a dedication of an
easement violated the Takings Clause.18 The Court, through Justice
Antonin Scalia, first explained the rationale for local governmental power
to impose conditions on projects that required developers to dedicate
land, dedications that would otherwise amount to takings.19 The rationale
began with the premise that the police power authorized a local
government to deny a permit for a project on the basis of a range of
impacts implicating recognized state interests.20 The Court then reasoned

12. See Ronald H. Rosenberg, The Changing Culture of American Land Use Regulation:
Paying for Growth with Impact Fees, 59 SMU L. REV. 177, 217 (2006).
13. See, e.g., id. at 181.
14. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 462.358 (2013) (authorizing a municipality to require
dedication of land for parks and playgrounds, or payment of fees for those purposes).
15. See Richard Briffault, Smart Growth and American Land Use Law, 21 ST. LOUIS U.
PUB. L. REV. 253, 263 (discussing “tax revolt[s]” that put increasing fiscal pressure on cities).
16. See, e.g., Billings Props., Inc. v. Yellowstone Cty., 394 P.2d 182, 186 (Mont. 1964)
(upholding a statute requiring a subdivision to show land dedicated for parks and playgrounds);
Jenad, Inc. v. Scarsdale, 218 N.E.2d 673, 674 (N.Y. 1966) (upholding a statute authorizing
dedications and fees); Jordan v. Menomonee, 137 N.W.2d 442, 446 (Wis. 1965) (upholding an
ordinance requiring the dedication of land for schools, parks, and recreation needs).
17. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
18. Id. at 834.
19. Id. at 832 (“Had California simply required the Nollans to make an easement across
their beachfront available to the public on a permanent basis in order to increase public access to
the beach[,] . . . we have no doubt there would have been a taking.”).
20. Id. at 836. The Court did state that a taking still could occur if the denial of the permit
drastically interfered with the Nollans’ use of their property. Id. at 836–37. The Court cited Penn
Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), thereby making it clear that the taking
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that if the agency did not deny the project, but instead imposed a
condition that served “the same legitimate police-power purpose as a
refusal to issue the permit,” then the condition was constitutionally
allowable.21 However, if the condition placed on the project “utterly fails
to further the end advanced as the justification for the prohibition”22—
i.e., the condition bears no nexus to the impact that it is supposedly
addressing—then the condition would effect a taking.23
Justice Scalia chose vivid language to describe the situation where a
nexus did not exist between the condition requiring a dedication and the
state interest that would support denial.24 If the condition was unrelated
to the interest, as the Court found under Nollan’s facts, then the condition
amounted to “an out-and-out plan of extortion” of the developer’s real
property by the local government.25 The Nollan opinion borrowed this
phrase from a decision by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, which
had found a taking when a local government required a developer to deed
seven and one-half percent of a subdivision’s total acreage to the local
jurisdiction.26
Seven years later, in Dolan v. City of Tigard,27 the Court took up the
related question of how close the connection must be between the
condition imposed and the impact that it addressed.28 In Dolan, a
municipality had imposed two exaction conditions on the approval of an
expanded hardware store.29 One condition required the owner to dedicate
part of a floodplain near an adjacent creek, and a second required the
dedication of a fifteen-foot strip next to the floodplain for a bicycle path.30
After surveying state court decisions on the issue, the Court held that the

in this instance would occur because of the overall regulatory impact on the use of the property,
not because of the individual exaction. Nollan, 583 U.S. at 836.
21. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836.
22. Id. at 837.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. (“[T]he lack of nexus between the condition and the original purpose of the building
restriction converts that purpose to something other than what it was. The purpose then becomes,
quite simply, the obtaining of an easement to serve some valid governmental purpose, but without
payment of compensation. Whatever may be the outer limits of ‘legitimate state interests’ in the
takings and land-use context, this is not one of them. In short, unless the permit condition serves
the same governmental purpose as the development ban, the building restriction is not a valid
regulation of land use but ‘an out-and-out plan of extortion.’” (quoting J.E.D. Assocs., Inc. v.
Town of Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14 (N.H. 1981)).
26. J.E.D. Assocs., 432 A.2d at 13–15.
27. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
28. Id. at 383.
29. Id. at 379.
30. Id. at 380.
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condition had to be roughly proportional to the impact being addressed.31
Notably—and for the first time—the Dolan Court declared that a
condition not meeting its newly enunciated “rough proportionality” test
amounted to an “unconstitutional condition.”32 In doing so, the Court
linked its takings cases on exactions to a larger body of law in which the
Court on occasion had invalidated governmental actions conferring a
benefit on the condition that the benefited person give up a constitutional
right.33 The Court termed this doctrine “well-settled.”34 The Court also
reiterated its statement in Nollan that a condition unrelated to the state
interest that it was addressing amounted to “an out-and-out plan of
extortion.”35 The absence of a nexus in Nollan, said the Court, “left the
Coastal Commission in the position of simply trying to obtain an
easement through gimmickry.”36
Thus, both Nollan and Dolan, the two landmark decisions establishing
the boundaries of local governmental authority to impose exactions,
employed the term “extortion” to describe exactions not meeting the
Court’s new tests.
B. Midpoint and Quiescence
After Nollan and Dolan, the development of the extortion narrative
entered a quiescent midpoint period.37 For the next nineteen years, the
Court did not decide any case directly addressing when exactions
constitute takings. However, the Court did touch upon the issue in several
opinions. Most importantly, in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.,38 the Court
unanimously disavowed part of the general test for regulatory takings—
the part inquiring whether the regulation substantially advanced a
legitimate state interest—that it had previously adopted.39 In doing so, the
31. Id. at 390–91.
32. Id. at 385; see Richard A. Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the
Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4, 6–7 (1988) (“In its canonical form, this doctrine [of
unconstitutional conditions] holds that even if a state has absolute discretion to grant or deny a
privilege or benefit, it cannot grant the privilege subject to conditions that improperly ‘coerce,’
‘pressure,’ or ‘induce’ the waiver of constitutional rights.”).
33. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385 (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Pickering v.
Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 387 (quoting Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987)).
36. Id. (“No such gimmicks are associated with the permit conditions imposed by the city
in this case.”).
37. A number of outstanding issues were left for resolution. One was whether the two cases
applied to fees as well as dedications of land. Another was whether they applied to exactions
imposed through legislation rather than adjudication.
38. 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
39. Id. at 540, 545.
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opinion by Justice O’Connor reviewed the legal landscape of regulatory
takings as a whole and seemed to place the exaction cases in a
particularized category. It saw Nollan and Dolan as decisions concerned
with regulations imposing conditions that require dedications of interests
in real property, in contrast to both takings of real property by actual
government occupation and general regulatory takings from land use
regulations.40
Additionally, Lingle emphasized that takings law focuses on the
regulation’s “actual burden imposed on property rights.”41 The Nollan
and Dolan cases, explained the Court, involved “government demands
that a landowner dedicate an easement allowing public access.”42
Consistent with this emphasis on the effects of regulation, Lingle declared
that the purpose of the judicial takings analysis is to ferret out “regulatory
actions that are functionally equivalent to a classic taking in which
government directly appropriates private property or ousts the owner
from his domain.”43 By contrast, the test for due process “probes the
regulation’s underlying validity.”44 Finally, the Lingle Court reiterated
that its decisions in Nollan and Dolan involved “a special application” of
the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.45 The decision did not
mention extortion.
Three other decisions during this midpoint period bear on later
developments in the extortion narrative. First, in Eastern Enterprises v.
Apfel,46 five members of the Court seemed to agree that the Takings
Clause did not encompass the taking of money where that money was not
segregated in a specific fund.47 If so, the holding might have meant that
an exaction requiring the payment of a fee would not fall under the Nollan
and Dolan tests. The Eastern Enterprises decision also indirectly
buttressed Lingle’s discussion of the principal exaction cases, Nollan and

40. Id. at 546–48. Citing Nollan and Dolan, the Court stated: “A permanent physical
invasion, however minimal the economic cost it entails, eviscerates the owner’s right to exclude
others from entering and using her property—perhaps the most fundamental of all property
interests.” Id. at 539.
41. Id. at 543.
42. Id. at 546.
43. Id. at 539.
44. Id. at 542–43.
45. Id. at 547 (quoting Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994)).
46. 524 U.S. 498 (1998).
47. See id. at 556 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“If the [Takings] Clause applies when the
government simply orders A to pay B, why does it not apply when the government simply orders
A to pay the government, i.e., when it assesses a tax?”); Id. at 542 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(“[T]he mechanism by which the Government injures Eastern is so unlike the act of taking specific
property that it is incongruous to call the Coal Act a taking . . . .”).
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Dolan, as rooted in the taking of real property.48
A year later in City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey,
Ltd.,49 the Court, in an opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy, found that
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had erroneously discussed
the rough proportionality test of Dolan in deciding a case about damages
caused by the denial of a project.50 The lower court had extended that test
“beyond the special context of exactions—land-use decisions
conditioning approval of development on the dedication of property to
public use.”51 Thus, consistent with Lingle, the Court again seemed to
cabin the Nollan and Dolan tests to a specific context.
Finally, in Kelo v. City of New London,52 a sharply divided Court
upheld the city’s decision that the taking of property for a large
redevelopment project met the “public use” requirement of the Takings
Clause.53 The decision did not concern exactions, but the Court’s
recognition of the role played by state legislatures is important. The
majority opinion by Justice John Paul Stevens took pains to point out that
state legislatures could provide greater protection than the Constitution
requires in this situation and that many states had done so.54 The opinion
thus recognized that legislative solutions were available to perceived
overreaching by local governments.
Therefore, at this midpoint, the extortion narrative was quiescent.
C. Ascension and Triumph
The narrative reemerged and triumphed in the 2013 Koontz decision,
authored by Justice Samuel Alito.55 After negotiations between the Water
District and the landowner failed, the Water District denied the
landowner’s permit to develop property, and he brought suit.56 Among
other claims, the landowner sought monetary damages under a state
statute allowing damages where a state agency’s action is “an
unreasonable exercise of the state’s police power constituting a taking
without just compensation.”57
48. Id. at 522 (majority opinion) (“This case does not present the ‘classi[c] taking’ in which
the government directly appropriates private property for its own use.” (quoting United States v.
Sec. Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 78 (1982))).
49. 526 U.S. 687 (1999).
50. Id. at 700, 703.
51. Id. at 702 (citing Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 841 (1987) and Dolan
v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994)).
52. 545 U.S. 469, 488–90 (2005).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 489.
55. 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013).
56. Id. at 2592–93.
57. Id. at 2593 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 373.617(2) (2015)).
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The Florida Supreme Court refused any relief under Nollan and Dolan
on two grounds. First, the Water District had denied the project rather
than approving it with conditions as in Nollan and Dolan.58 Second, the
conditions that the Water District had proposed but not adopted involved
the payment of money, not the dedication of real property.59 Accordingly,
the Florida court thought that Nollan and Dolan did not support the
landowner’s claim for damages.60
Justice Alito began his opinion by emphasizing that the Nollan and
Dolan decisions “provide important protection against the misuse of the
power of land-use regulation.”61 He characterized the Water District as
“believ[ing] that it circumvented” those two decisions by structuring the
handling of the permit application as a denial rather than an approval with
conditions.62 The opinion then turned to the conditions. It cited the
Court’s prior exaction decisions as reflecting a “realit[y] of the permitting
process”—“land-use permit applicants are especially vulnerable to the
type of coercion that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine prohibits
because the government often has broad discretion to deny a permit that
is worth far more than property it would like to take.”63
The Court held that the principles underlying Nollan and Dolan do not
change depending on whether the government approves a permit with
conditions or denies a permit because the applicant refuses to agree to
those conditions.64 Ultimately, however, Justice Alito agreed that no
taking had occurred: “Where the permit is denied and the condition is
never imposed, nothing has been taken.”65 This conclusion did not end
the case, but it affected the possible remedies available to the landowner.
While a taking requires just compensation, an excessive demand without
a taking does not require damages as a matter of federal constitutional
law.66 Rather, the availability of damages depends on the particular cause
of action, whether state or federal, that the landowner alleges.67 In this
58. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 77 So. 3d 1220, 1231 (2011), rev’d, 133
S. Ct. 2586 (2013).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1230 (“Accordingly, we hold that . . . the Nollan/Dolan rule . . . is applicable only
where the condition/exaction sought by the government involves a dedication of or over the
owner’s interest in real property in exchange for permit approval; and only when the regulatory
agency actually issues the permit sought . . . .”).
61. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2591.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 2594.
64. Id. at 2596 (“Our unconstitutional conditions cases have long refused to attach
significance to the distinction between conditions precedent and conditions subsequent.”).
65. Id. at 2597.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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case, because the landowner had brought a state cause of action, the Court
refused to address possible federal remedies for the unconstitutional
conditions.68
The Court then turned to another key question: Whether an exaction
could result in a taking when it required a landowner to pay money rather
than dedicate an interest in real property.69 Distinguishing the two types
of exactions, said the Court, would make it “very easy for land-use
permitting officials to evade the limitations of Nollan and Dolan.”70 The
Court rejected the claim that treating monetary exactions as takings
would make it difficult to distinguish them from taxes, which are
generally exempt from takings analysis.71 Although the dissent criticized
this part of the holding, Justice Alito dismissed the dissent’s position as
“really an argument for overruling Nollan and Dolan.”72 Finally, the
Court ended its decision by circling back to the same extortion narrative
with which it began, characterizing itself as “[m]indful of the special
vulnerability of land use permit applicants to extortionate demands for
money.”73
In sum, the Koontz Court characterized applicants as individuals at
risk of extortion by local government officials and suggested that the
Water District had tried to manipulate the Court’s prior decisions to
increase its regulatory leverage. Consistent with these concerns, the Court
found a violation of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, even while
recognizing that no taking had occurred because the Water District had
not actually imposed conditions on a project approval. At the same time,
the Court extended the protections of Nollan and Dolan to at least some,
if not all, monetary conditions imposed on a development approval.74 The
holding and reasoning of Koontz thus fully reflect the extortion narrative
in the context of exactions takings.
II. EXTORTION AS A TAKINGS NARRATIVE
The extortion narrative operates both as an explanatory device for
understanding the Court’s takings law and as a tool for predicting the
future direction of that law. This Part first examines the idea of judicial
narratives generally and the role that they play in jurisprudence. It then
sets forth the basis for and contours of the extortion narrative expounded
68. Id.
69. Id. at 2598.
70. Id. at 2599.
71. Id. at 2600–01.
72. Id. at 2602.
73. Id. at 2603.
74. The Court did not decide whether its holding applied if the local government established
the fees legislatively rather than through adjudication.
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in the exaction takings cases.
A. The Narrative Concept in Law
Generally speaking, a narrative is a story,75 and a large and varied
body of scholarship has explored the role that narratives play in the law.76
This scholarship has demonstrated that the concept of narratives pervades
the law.77 Most prominently, narratives persuade78 and therefore serve as
vehicles for advocates to employ.79 Lawyers seek to create a story from
the facts, perhaps including a familiar pattern, that will incentivize the
court to rule in their favor.80 Narratives can serve other, quite different
functions as well, such as providing a means of expressing the viewpoints
of silenced minorities.81
The scholarship has also shown that narratives play an important role
in judicial opinions. In a fundamental sense, judges must narrate the facts
upon which their decisions rest—the “story . . . to be judged.”82 However,
it is the relation of those facts to a broader landscape that is relevant here.

75. Anne E. Ralph, Not the Same Old Story: Using Narrative Theory to Understand and
Overcome the Plausibility Pleading Standard, 26 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 25 (2014) (“A narrative
is, in short, a story. Narrative theory studies not only the composition, but also the transmission
and reception of stories.” (footnote omitted)).
76. See, e.g., LAW’S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW (Peter Brooks & Paul
Gewirtz eds., 1996); ANTHONY AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW (2002).
77. Peter Brooks, Narrative in and of the Law, in A COMPANION TO NARRATIVE THEORY
415, 416 (James Phelan & Peter J. Rabinowitz eds., 2005) (noting “the pervasive presence of
narrative throughout the law”).
78. See Linda L. Berger, How Embedded Knowledge Structures Affect Judicial Decision
Making: A Rhetorical Analysis of Metaphor, Narrative, and Imagination in Child Custody
Disputes, 18 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 259, 268–69 (2009) (discussing explanations for the
persuasive power of narrative).
79. See, e.g., Kenneth D. Chestek, Competing Stories: A Case Study of the Role of Narrative
Reasoning in Judicial Decisions, 9 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC 99, 102 (2012) (“Narrative
reasoning does not supplant the rule-based reason (the law) that allows the court to rule in the
client's favor; rather, it provides a reason for the court to want to rule in the client’s favor.”).
80. See id.
81. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for
Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411, 2412 (1989); Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of
the Agony Between Legal Power and Narrative Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2225, 2228 (1989)
(“In narrative, we take experience and configure it in a conventional and comprehensible form.
This is what gives narrative its communicative power; it is what makes narrative a powerful tool
of persuasion and, therefore, a potential transformative device for the disempowered.”).
82. Larry Catá Backer, Tweaking Facts, Speaking Judgment: Judicial Transmogrification
of Case Narrative as Jurisprudence in the United States and Britain, 6 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J.
611, 613 (1998) (citing as an important foundation of judging, “the crafting of official narrative,
the creation of the story of the people and events to be judged”).
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Judges will examine the facts of a case, relate them to a larger narrative83
or interpretive framework,84 and then use the particular facts of the case
that fit into that narrative framework.85 Thus, an opinion’s sense of what
happened in a case depends in part on the narrative framework chosen by
the opinion writer.86 From that narrative flows a number of consequences,
including the legal consequences that the narrative can justify.87 Scholars
have identified such judicial narratives at work in an array of legal
subjects.88
This narrative framework has several important features. First, it is
culturally based.89 A judge constructs the narrative backdrop from her
perceptions of how the world operates, and that construction affects the
judge’s choice of legal rules.90 Second, and relatedly, the narrative serves

83. Shulamit Almog, As I Read, I Weep—In Praise of Judicial Narrative, 26 OKLA. CITY
U. L. REV. 471, 473 (2001) (“[J]udges are often overcome by the urge to construct a complete
narrative, embellished by personal preferences, selections, and skills.”).
84. J. Christopher Rideout, A Twice-Told Tale: Plausibility and Narrative Coherence in
Judicial Storytelling, 10 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC 67, 69 (2013) (“[T]he facts in a legal contest
are seldom self-evident, for they are viewed not in a vacuum, but rather within interpretive
frameworks. . . . Facts become meaningful within a story structure, a structure that guides their
interpretation.”).
85. Geoffrey Miller, Narrative and Truth in Judicial Opinions: Corporate Charitable
Giving Cases, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 831, 832 (“An important question for judicial
opinions . . . concerns the accuracy of the mapping between the underlying facts and the
description of those facts in the narrative.”).
86. Ralph, supra note 75, at 34 (“[T]he legal academy is coming to a greater recognition
that the sense of what happened in a particular case depends in great part on the choice of a
narrative.”).
87. Berger, supra note 78, at 265–66 (noting that from the perspective of cognitive theorists,
“what matters is how metaphor and narrative work, what perceptions and inferences flow from
their use, what interpretations they make possible, and what actions and consequences they
justify”).
88. See Michael C. Dorf, Iqbal and Bad Apples, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 217, 218–20
(2010) (discussing the “few-bad-apples narrative” in opinions addressing the harsh treatment of
detainees). See generally Berger, supra note 78 (narratives in child custody law); Mae Kuykendall
& David Westbrook, Introduction: Unsettling Questions, Disquieting Stories, 2009 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 817 (symposium on narratives in corporate law); Erin Sheley, The “Constable’s Blunder”
and Other Stories: Narrative Representations of the Police and the Criminal in the Development
of the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 121 (explaining narratives
in search and seizure law); Lawrence S. Zacharias, The Narrative Impulse in Judicial Opinions,
23 L. & LITERATURE 80 (2011) (same).
89. Winter, supra note 81, at 2270 (“Thus, to tell a story that will be both meaningful and
compelling, the judge . . . must make use of preexisting cultural knowledge in ways that will seem
natural to those subject to the legal rule because already grounded in social experience and
mediated by existing cultural models.”).
90. Id. (noting that under this view, “those who comprise the legal hierarchy do exercise
substantial power in choosing legal rules or cultural norms”).
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an ideological function91 and can provide moral guidance supporting the
outcome.92 Accordingly, to perhaps a considerable degree, the narrative
motivates the Court’s decision-making, allowing it to resolve the case in
a way that comports with its values.93 Third, the images chosen for the
narrative framework can impel the conclusion that the Court reaches.94
Finally, while the narrative framework must remain generally faithful to
the real world so that it can persuade readers,95 it nonetheless has a
manipulative element. Judges can choose or channel facts in the narrative
in a way that evokes a foreseeable response from the reader, thus helping
to justify the decision.96
In the takings field, a 1988 article identified the important role that
narrative was beginning to play in the development of the
constitutional jurisprudence on exactions. Professor Gregory
Alexander described the early exaction cases as a story of “power and
fear,” one about a “perceived imbalance of power” between private
landowners and government regulators.97 He suggested that courts were
not generating takings law by a “methodological or theoretical concern,
but by the pictures that judges have in their heads about the participants
in the public land-use planning arena.”98 Underlying political visions that
are not subject to empirical verification, argued Professor Gregory, shape
91. Berger, supra note 78, at 269 (explaining that the frameworks for thinking constructed
by story and image “work similarly to religious symbols in serving ideological functions”).
92. Zacharias, supra note 88, at 110 (noting that “[n]arrative can provide moral guidance in
evaluating surveillance” cases).
93. Susan Bandes, Searching for Worlds Beyond the Canon: Narrative, Rhetoric, and Legal
Change, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 271, 285 (2003) (“[T]here are always multiple basic stories that
can be constructed. No narrative version can be independent of a particular teller and occasion of
telling, and, therefore . . . we may assume that every narrative version has been constructed in
accord with some set of purposes or interests.” (citation omitted) (quoting Barbara Herrnstein
Smith, Narrative Versions, Narrative Theories, 7 CRITICAL INQUIRY: ON NARRATIVE 217, 221
(1980))).
94. Winter, supra note 81, at 2276 (“One reason for the transformative potential of narrative
is its capacity to present forceful images . . . .”).
95. Ralph, supra note 75, at 30 (discussing the concept of “[n]arrative fidelity” or
“similarity to what an audience member knows to be true in the real world”).
96. See, e.g., Almog, supra note 83, at 488 (“The creation of every narrative . . . entails a
manipulative element . . . .”); Backer, supra note 82, at 613 (“Courts take the stories they receive
as raw material. In their hands, this raw material is transmogrified into something very
different.”); Rideout, supra note 84, at 87 (discussing “value-motivated cognition,” which is “the
tendency of people to resolve factual ambiguities in a manner that generates conclusions congenial
to self-defining values” (quoting Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald Graman, Whose
Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Liberalism, 122 HARV.
L. REV. 837, 903 (2009))).
97. Gregory S. Alexander, Takings, Narratives, and Power, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1752, 1752
(1988).
98. Id. at 1753.
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these pictures.99
Since then, the Court’s takings jurisprudence on exactions has
reflected the majority’s allegiance to a narrative that local governments
extort interests in real property and, after Koontz, money from property
developers. Modern takings literature, however, has overlooked the
importance of this narrative, as authors have instead focused on the
significant doctrinal inconsistencies in the Court’s opinions.100 This
Article suggests that the Court’s adherence to and development of the
extortion narrative explains the outcomes and that this narrative is likely
to drive decisions in future exactions cases. It is time to pay close
attention to the narrative.
B. The Contours of the Extortion Narrative
A careful examination of the Court’s statements about extortion in its
exaction cases reveals a full narrative. The basis of this extortion narrative
is that local government officials improperly use their regulatory powers
to force developers to give up property. The narrative necessarily
connotes a notion of ever-present bad faith on the officials’ part, which
leads to the Court’s consequent distrust of local government actions.
Furthermore, in Nollan, the Court declared that if the exaction did not
meet the “essential nexus” test adopted in that case, then it amounted to
“an out-and-out plan of extortion.”101 The modifying phrase “out-andout” suggests that the entire regulatory process of imposing exactions is
extortionate, only becoming publicly exposed as “out-and-out” extortion
if the test is not met.
The Koontz decision considerably fleshes out the narrative. That
decision situates public officials as viewing the Fifth Amendment as an
obstacle to avoid by any means possible rather than as a constitutional
protection to honor and follow. The Court talked about the Water District
deliberately attempting to circumvent the constitutional restrictions of
Nollan and Dolan and about the “misuse of the power of land use
regulation.”102 Earlier, in Dolan, the Court referred to “gimmickry”
utilized by the local government to impose exactions.103

99. Id. at 1753–54.
100. See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Hard Bargains and Real Steals: Land Use Exactions
Revisited, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1, 12 (2000) (“The conflicts among courts regarding the reach of
Nollan and Dolan suggest larger conceptual inconsistencies.”).
101. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (quoting J.E.D. Assocs., Inc.
v. Town of Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14 (N.H. 1981)).
102. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2591 (2013).
103. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 387 (1994).
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According to the narrative, the government has an incentive to
overreach in placing conditions on the approval,104 and developers will
fear opposing such overreaching because the government may react by
simply denying the permit. And, as one might expect in a narrative, the
Court sees or implies facts that fit the narrative. Its accusation of
deliberate circumvention is such an implication.
Finally, the narrative places the Court in the role of protector of a class
of litigants rather than an arbiter between competing interests. Instead of
merely establishing the dividing line between proper regulation and a
taking, the Court’s role now is to defend landowners from constant
overreaching by local officials. In Koontz, the Court does so by inserting
itself as a monitor into the bargaining process between landowners and
local governments.
Justice Alito never explains the basis for his fundamental premise that
governments are prone to misuse their land use power.105 Nor is such an
explanation offered in Nollan or Dolan, the cases that originated the
extortion narrative. The narrative, however, likely originates from a
couple of sources.
First, some economic theory posits that local governments will use
their authority to overreach in mandating exactions from developers.106
The extortion narrative owes much to public choice theory, which
proposes that, like individuals acting in the private sector, regulators will
act largely in their self-interest.107 In the situation of exactions, political
104. In Snyder v. Board of County Commissioners of Brevard County, a Florida appellate
court articulated this theory:
In this context, local governments frequently use governmental authority to make
a rezoning decision as leverage in order to negotiate, impose, coerce and compel
concessions and conditions on the developer. Such techniques used by local
zoning officials as “floating zones,” or “contract or conditional zoning” are more
analogous to administrative or executive decision-making than legislative
policy-making and would be immediately and justifiably condemned in any
proper judicial forum as being unjust and unfair if not extortion.
595 So. 2d 65, 73 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (footnotes omitted), decision quashed, 627 So. 2d
469 (Fla. 1993).
105. See Koontz, 113 S. Ct. at 2608 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“No one has presented evidence
that in the many States declining to apply heightened scrutiny to permitting fees, local officials
routinely short-circuit Nollan and Dolan to extort the surrender of real property interests having
no relation to a development’s costs.”).
106. See, e.g., Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Takings Reassessed, 87 VA. L. REV.
277, 289 (2001) (“Efficiency-based justifications focus on the concern that without compensation,
the government will excessively exercise its eminent domain power.”).
107. Zachary J. Gubler, Public Choice Theory and the Private Securities Market, 91 N.C. L.
REV. 745, 748 (2013) (“Public choice theory views laws and regulations as products that are
traded in a political marketplace.”).
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actors will seek to increase their chances for reelection by extracting a
wider array of benefits for voters from projects proposed by developers.
Politicians will suffer little detriment from these actions because the
voters who will benefit from them far outnumber developers who will
bear the loss.108 In Nollan, Justice Scalia adverted to such concerns in
declaring that where a regime could leverage the police power, one would
expect “stringent land-use regulation which the State then waives to
accomplish other purposes.”109
Some land use literature likewise cites overreaching by local
governments in regulating new development.110 However, studies
systematically examining conditions that local governments placed on
projects and finding that they overreached have not appeared,111 perhaps
because the design of such a study presents considerable difficulty.
Furthermore, countervailing arguments exist that reject the idea of
municipal extortion. For example, the ability of developers to “exit” from
individual jurisdictions if they perceive government overreaching might
prevent extortionate demands upon them.112 Other literature cites the
economic power of development interests at the local government level,
positing that this power amounts to a “growth machine” that dictates
outcomes before municipalities.113 The extortion narrative necessarily

108. Timothy M. Mulvaney, The Remnants of Exaction Takings, 33 ENVIRONS: ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y 189, 200 (2010) [hereinafter Mulvaney, Remnants of Exaction Takings] (“The majority
perceived the [Nollan] case from the vision of a public-choice theorist.”).
109. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 n.5 (1987).
110. See, e.g., Adam J. McLeod, Identifying Values in Land Use Regulation, 101 KY. L.J.
55, 56–57 (2012–13) (“Unless states get their local governments under control, these calls [for
national legislation or curtailing local planning power] are likely to gain increased support.”);
Ronald H. Rosenberg, When Lochner Met Dolan: The Attempted Transformation of American
Land-Use Law by Constitutional Interpretation, 33 URB. LAW. 663, 665 (2001) (citing “an
increasingly visible and vocal sentiment that environmental regulation and land-use control has
been unreasonable, unfair and even abusive to some landowners”); David Schleicher, City
Unplanning, 122 YALE L.J. 1670, 1704 (2013) (developing a theoretical argument for why zoning
“has become much more restrictive in our biggest and richest cities, so much so that it has begun
harming regional and national economic growth”).
111. There are studies of fees that governments impose. See, e.g., Clancy Mullen, National
Impact Fee Survey: 2012, IMPACTFEES.COM 1 (Aug. 20, 2012), http://www.impactfees.com/pub
lications%20pdf/2012_survey.pdf. But this study is not a systematic survey that would meet the
empirical prerequisites for validity.
112. See Vicki Been, “Exit” as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 475 (1991); Kenneth A. Stahl,
Reliance in Land Use Law, 2013 BYU L. REV. 949, 1005–06 (analyzing the possibility of
developer exit).
113. See John R. Logan & Harvey L. Molotch, URBAN FORTUNES: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF PLACE 1–2, 17–29 (1987); Harvey L. Molotch, The City as a Growth Machine: Toward a
Political Economy of Place, 82 AM. J. SOC. 309 (1976). But see Vicki Been, Josiah Madar &
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rejects these ideas, albeit silently.
Other factors likely motivated in part the Court’s acceptance of the
extortion narrative. One important factor is the expansion in the types of
impacts that form the basis for exactions imposed as conditions on
projects. As concerns over environmental degradation have expanded
over the last forty years, local governments have increasingly responded
by conditioning project approvals to minimize impacts on a broader
variety of environmental concerns.114 For example, local governments
now condition projects to minimize impacts on wildlife and wetlands, as
occurred in Koontz.115 The object of these conditions has also broadened
beyond the environment to a variety of socioeconomic impacts,
particularly impacts on housing.116 Ironically, the takings test adopted in
Nollan, which emphasizes the identification of project impacts and the
relationship between those impacts and conditions placed on the project,
has in part led to this increase.117 Moreover, local governments have
become more sophisticated in documenting a wider range of specific
project impacts.118
Another reason for the narrative’s rise may lie in the expansion of
exactions that has occurred as negotiations have become routine between
local governments and developers.119 The results of these negotiations are
often contracts, known as development agreements, setting forth the
conditions for developing a project as well as the infrastructure and fees
for which developers are responsible.120 With the rise of development
Simon McDonnell, Urban Land-Use Regulation: Are Homevoters Overtaking the Growth
Machine?, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 227, 228–33 (2014).
114. Paul Boudreaux, The Impact XAT: A New Approach to Charging for Growth, 43 U.
MEM. L. REV. 35, 57–58 (2012) (noting that “[a]dvocates of impact fees have convinced both
legislatures and courts that it is more equitable to charge the developer for the [infrastructure]
costs” and discussing other scholars who have advocated such fees).
115. See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2610–11 (2013);
Finley v. Inland Wetlands Comm’n, 959 A.2d 569, 589 (Conn. 2008) (challenging the permit
granted by commission subject to conditions).
116. See, e.g., Commercial Builders v. City of Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872, 876 (9th Cir. 1991)
(upholding an ordinance placing a fee on nonresidential construction to offset impacts of such
construction).
117. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987).
118. To date, however, local governments have not attempted to impose conditions on the
full range of impacts from projects. Mark Fenster, Regulating Land Use in a Constitutional
Shadow: The Institutional Contexts of Exactions, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 729, 737 (2007) [hereinafter
Fenster, Regulating Land Use] (“Nor do exactions capture the full range of impacts for new
development, as non-omnipotent local governments frequently shy away from imposing full-cost
exactions or are barred from doing so by their state legislatures.”).
119. See Daniel P. Selmi, The Contract Transformation in Land Use Regulation, 63 STAN.
L. REV. 591, 593 (2011).
120. Id.
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agreements, the parties to such contracts have expanded the scope of
possible conditions well beyond those allowed under the Court’s
exactions jurisprudence. The theory is that in entering into an agreement
with a municipality, a developer voluntarily waives its constitutionally
based right to compensation for certain conditions on the project that
otherwise would constitute a taking under Nollan and Dolan.121 Thus, the
scope of exactions can exceed the limits set by those cases. Whether such
waivers are valid remains uncertain, but the Court may perceive the wellknown expansion of the scope of negotiations as a form of governmental
extortion.122
Third, once the Court began articulating the extortion narrative in
Nollan, development interest groups perceived an important vehicle both
for attracting the Court’s attention to appeals and for articulating a theme
in briefing them. That tactic is apparent in Koontz. The Court began
hearing a steady drumbeat about extortion from interest groups that
sought to further tighten the constitutional standard for exaction takings
and that perceive Fifth Amendment takings law as unfairly tilting toward
the government’s interests.123
Finally, as with other areas of constitutional law, the extortion charge
likely aligns with the personal political ideologies of the individual
Justices who make up the majority in the exactions cases.124 In particular,
the expansion of environmental concerns addressed by land use
conditions has been politically controversial, and any national consensus

121. Id. at 610.
122. According to Professor Vicki Been,
Zoning has moved from a set of rigid prescriptive rules about land use to a more
flexible set of standards, which allow the specifics of the requirements imposed
on each proposed development to vary with the . . . groups affected by the
proposal. That flexibility creates dangers, however, that the negotiations
surrounding land use development may be unfair to the developer or to those
affected by the development, or that the negotiations may stand in the way of a
development that would increase the overall social welfare by producing more
benefits than costs.
Vicki Been, Community Benefits Agreements: A New Local Government Tool or Another
Variation on the Exactions Theme?, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 5, 12 (2010).
123. See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, 9, 12, Koontz v. St. Johns Water Mgmt.
Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013) (No. 11-1447) (using the word “extortion” several times, including
three quotes of “out-and-out plan of extortion”).
124. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Precedent Viewed Through the Lens of Hartian
Positivist Jurisprudence, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1107, 1111 (2008) (“According to studies by political
scientists who have developed a so-called ‘attitudinal model,’ the Justices consistently vote in
accordance with their political ideologies; their invocations of precedent are mere window
dressing.”).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016

19

Florida Law Review, Vol. 68, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 6

342

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

about environmental values is difficult to identify.125 Given the extent to
which the need for environmental protection has become disputed, it is
not surprising that the Supreme Court has sharply divided in exaction
cases.126 Indeed, all three key cases—Nollan, Dolan, and Koontz—
involved conditions broadly concerning the environment. The force with
which the Court articulated the extortion narrative in Nollan and Koontz
suggests that distrust of local government efforts at environmental
protection lies near the center of the narrative.127
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE EXTORTION NARRATIVE
The extortion narrative has become a central feature of the Court’s
current takings jurisprudence on exactions, with the Koontz decision
illustrating the narrative’s importance. It has, however, received little
attention, with most observers viewing the language as a form of judicial
hyperbole. If the extortion narrative is taken seriously and seen as
supplying a framework for addressing takings cases, it has important
implications for the development of takings law.
This Part explores those implications. Some of the implications
further illuminate the Court’s recent holdings, while others suggest its
future development. Although the narrative is not necessarily outcomedeterminative, the Court’s emphasis on it indicates that it could play a
large role in evolving takings theory.
A. Transcending Real Property
Historically, the Fifth Amendment’s protections have centered on real
property.128 The language of the amendment itself is neutral on the point:
“nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.”129 However, although scholars dispute the matter, the
majority of scholars have concluded that the Framers did not intend the
125. See, e.g., Naomi Oreskes, Science and Public Policy: What’s Proof Got To Do With It?,
7 ENV’T & POL’Y 369, 369 (2004) (“In recent years it has become common for informed defenders
of the status quo to argue that the scientific information pertinent to an environmental claim is
uncertain, unreliable, and fundamentally, unproven. Lack of proof is then used to deny demands
for action.”).
126. Nollan, Dolan, and Koontz were each 5–4 decisions.
127. However, while the environment may have taken center stage in these cases, the rules
apply to all types of exactions. These include infrastructure conditions (such as for roads and
playgrounds) that local governments have routinely imposed since the 1960s.
128. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027–28 (1992) (citing the traditional
distinction of greater constitutional protection given to real property than personal property);
Bridget C.E. Dooling, Take It Past the Limit: Regulatory Takings of Personal Property, 16 FED.
CIR. B.J. 445, 446 (2007) (“Lucas cemented the long-standing, but inexplicit, judicial principle
that personal property is less protected from regulatory takings than real property.”).
129. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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Fifth Amendment to extend beyond physical takings of real property.130
Additionally, most modern case law on the amendment concerns real
property.131 Indeed, real property was the starting point for the framework
adopted in Nollan for evaluating exactions. The California Coastal
Commission had conditioned the Nollans’ permit approval on the
dedication of an easement across the beach, and the Court began by
observing that if the government had physically taken such an easement,
the Fifth Amendment would require payment for that interest in land.132
The extortion narrative, however, suggests that the Fifth
Amendment’s traditional doctrinal anchor in real property is too
narrow.133 Under that narrative, a chief purpose of the amendment is
preventing local governments from using their regulatory leverage to
extort property from developers by placing conditions on development.134
This new purpose allows the Court to expand the reach of takings law in
two important ways.
First, as long as the extortion process occurs during the land use
process generally, the Court can shape Fifth Amendment doctrine to
capture and regulate a wider variety of extortionate actions. After Nollan
and Dolan, scholars debated at length whether those decisions applied to
monetary exactions imposed on a development as well as to required
dedications of real property.135 The debate largely focused on whether the
130. See John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance for Modern Takings
Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1252, 1253 (1996); Mulvaney, Remnants of Exaction Takings, supra
note 108, at 194 (“Few scholars interpret historical evidence to support the contention that the
Framers of the U.S. Constitution envisioned the Takings Clause to restrict any government action
beyond physical invasions.” (footnote omitted)); William Michael Treanor, The Original
Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 782
(1995) (“The original understanding of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment was clear on
two points. The clause required compensation when the federal government physically took
private property, but not when government regulations limited the ways in which property could
be used.” (footnote omitted)). But see Andrew S. Gold, The Diminishing Equivalence Between
Regulatory Takings and Physical Takings, 107 DICK. L. REV. 571, 579 (2003) (arguing that “there
is historical evidence to support a broad reading of the Takings Clause that would cover regulatory
takings”).
131. While categorizing takings cases can be subjective, beginning with Nollan in 1987, the
Court has decided thirteen takings cases that have involved real property, far more than other
categories. See ROBERT MELTZ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97-122, TAKINGS DECISIONS OF THE U.S.
SUPREME COURT: A CHRONOLOGY (2015).
132. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (“Had California simply required
the Nollans to make an easement across their beachfront available to the public on a permanent
basis in order to increase public access to the beach . . . we have no doubt there would have been
a taking.”).
133. Id. at 837.
134. Id.
135. Compare Robert H. Freilich & David W. Bushek, Thou Shalt Not Take Title Without
Adequate Planning: The Takings Equation After Dolan v. City of Tigard, 27 URB. LAW. 187, 201
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rationale for the essential nexus and rough proportionality tests in those
two cases was limited to real property.136 Now, however, if a primary
focus of takings in the exactions context is constraining extortionate
government power, courts could effectuate that purpose by subjecting
monetary fees to the Nollan and Dolan tests.137 In Koontz, the Court did
just that, extending its takings holdings to include monetary fees that the
Water District seemed to impose on an individual basis. The extortion
narrative would plainly support that extension.138
Second, the question remains whether the extension to fees includes
legislatively established fees. Traditional principles of administrative law
treat actions that are quasi-legislative differently from those that are

(1995) (stating that Dolan is limited to exactions of real property), with Carlos A. Ball & Laurie
Reynolds, Exactions and Burden Distribution in Takings Law, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1513,
1569–70 (arguing that Dolan should also apply to monetary exactions), and Catherine L. Hall,
Valid Regulation of Land-Use or an Out-and-Out Plan of Extortion? Commentary on St. Johns
River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 41 REAL EST. L.J. 270, 291 (2012) (“A survey of state and
federal decisions reveals there is considerable disagreement about when the application of Nollan
and Dolan apply to the exactions takings analysis. Many courts have concluded that a condition
must be adjudicative or ad hoc, as opposed to legislative, to be reviewable under the exactions
takings analysis, yet there is still ongoing debate.” (citing Steven A. Haskins, Closing the Dolan
Deal—Bridging the Legislative/Adjudicative Divide, 38 URB. LAW. 487, 501 (2006))).
136. Compare J. David Breemer, The Evolution of the “Essential Nexus”: How State and
Federal Courts Have Applied Nollan and Dolan and Where They Should Go from Here, 59 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 373, 395–96 (2002) (“When one looks beyond the bare facts of Nollan and Dolan
and examines the purposes underlying the essential nexus standard, it becomes apparent that the
test cannot easily be limited to exactions of real property and/or exactions imposed
administratively. Indeed, those purposes logically call for an integrated doctrine that recognizes
the constitutional equivalency of monetary exactions. . . .”), with Freilich & Bushek, supra note
135, at 201–03 (test only applies to takings of real property).
137. See Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 444 (1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 529
(1996) (applying Nollan and Dolan to non-possessory exactions such as fees, which are
established adjudicatively, and reasoning that “[u]nder this view of the constitutional role of the
consolidated ‘essential nexus’ and ‘rough proportionality’ tests, it matters little whether the local
land use permit authority demands the actual conveyance of property or the payment of a monetary
exaction”).
138. For an argument for such an extension, see Somin, supra note 9, at 238 (“Justice Alito
also seeks to distinguish the water district’s demands from taxes, user fees, and other typical
financial exactions imposed by the government, by emphasizing that this ‘monetary obligation
burdened petitioner’s ownership of a specific parcel of land.’ Here, Justice Kagan makes a good
point where she notes that property taxes and some types of fees for public services also burden
ownership of a specific parcel of land. Thus, the majority’s attempt to exclude such taxes and user
fees from Nollan-Dolan scrutiny seems arbitrary. . . .”).
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quasi-adjudicative,139 with more deference given to the former.140 The
extortion narrative, however, casts doubt on whether any distinction
should exist between fees that local governments legislatively adopt and
fees they impose adjudicatively.141 Presumably, both legislative and
adjudicative decisions can reflect the assumed extortionate motives of
municipalities, and those motives would override the types of protections
for landowners that some courts have found inherent in the features of the
legislative arena.142
Furthermore, since staff members report to elected officials, the
extortion narrative might suggest that staff cannot be relied upon to offer
impartial advice when recommending the imposition of fees. Indeed, the
fees challenged in Nollan and Dolan actually were legislatively adopted
fees, further suggesting that this legislative–adjudicative distinction is no
longer determinative.143
In sum, viewed through the extortion narrative, real property no longer
anchors takings theory, at least as far as exactions are concerned.144
139. See Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 628 (1935) (“In administering the
provisions of the statute in respect of ‘unfair methods of competition’—that is to say in filling in
and administering the details embodied by that general standard—the commission acts in part
quasi-legislatively and in part quasi-judicially.”).
140. See, e.g., Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1056 (D.C. Cir. 1979)
(“Our discussion of the scope of review of agency rulemaking shows that the quasi-legislative
nature of rulemaking requires even greater agency freedom to manage and structure
decisionmaking than is required in licensing or adjudication.”).
141. But see Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 464.
142. See Home Builders Ass’n of Cent. Ariz. v. City of Scottsdale, 930 P.2d 993, 1000 (Ariz.
1997) (“The risk of that sort of leveraging does not exist when the exaction is embodied in a
generally applicable legislative decision.”); San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City of San Francisco, 41
P.3d 87, 105 (Cal. 2002) (“While legislatively mandated fees do present some danger of improper
leveraging, such generally applicable legislation is subject to the ordinary restraints of the
democratic political process. A city council that charged extortionate fees for all property
development, unjustifiable by mitigation needs, would likely face widespread and well-financed
opposition at the next election. Ad hoc individual monetary exactions deserve special judicial
scrutiny mainly because, affecting fewer citizens and evading systematic assessment, they are
more likely to escape such political controls.”).
143. See, e.g., Timothy M. Mulvaney, Exactions for the Future, 64 BAYLOR L. REV. 511, 539
(2012) [hereinafter Mulvaney, Exactions for the Future] (“[T]he legislative-adjudicative
distinction is arguably belied by Nollan and Dolan’s facts.”).
144. In a 2015 decision, Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015), the Supreme Court
held that the government’s physical taking of raisins, even though part of a broader government
regulatory program design to stabilize raising production and prices, constituted a per se taking.
Id. at 2430. The Court made it clear that it was addressing a physical taking of property, not a
regulatory taking. Id. at 2428 (noting the “settled difference in [its] takings jurisprudence between
appropriation and regulation”). But its explanation for the ruling suggests that, for Fifth
Amendment purposes, the Court sees no distinction between the taking of real property and the
taking of personal property. After examining the history of the Fifth Amendment, the Court
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B. Prophylactic Protection
Next, to prevent perceived extortion, the Court can now consider
whether the Fifth Amendment’s protections activate only when the
government has actually imposed a regulation on the property itself or
instead provide prophylactic protection at even earlier stages of the
regulatory process.145 This issue also implicates the remedy for any
violation. The issue lies at the center of Koontz, for in that case the
government had not actually imposed any conditions. Instead, after
negotiations in which the developer refused to agree to the proposed
conditions, it denied the project.146
The language of the Fifth Amendment—“nor shall private property be
taken”147—seemingly indicates that the government must actually
impose the regulation. It requires compensation only for “taken”
property. However, the extortion narrative’s premise of government
overreaching through leveraging the police power suggests a need to
protect landowners during the process that precedes a taking. The
argument would be that if the local government improperly uses its
leverage during negotiations, then the takings doctrine should protect
landowners from that overreach, whether or not the government finally
decides to act.148
The Court, of course, adopted that prophylactic interpretation in
Koontz.149 But aside from the extortion narrative, a certain logic supports
at least a narrow extension in that direction. If the Fifth Amendment
requires the imposition of conditions before its protections apply, local
governments could achieve outcomes and avoid compensation simply
through clever lawyering. The Nollan and Dolan protections certainly
apply to an approval with conditions; the landowner receives approval as
long as she complies with the conditions. To avoid Nollan and Dolan, a
local government might impose requirements as conditions precedent to

concluded that “[n]othing in this history suggests that personal property was any less protected
against physical appropriation than real property.” Id. at 2427.
145. See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2608 (2013) (Kagan,
J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 2591 (majority opinion) (“[T]he District, after suggesting that he could obtain
approval by signing over such an interest, denied his application because he refused to yield.”).
147. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.”).
148. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2595 (“[The government] may not leverage its legitimate interest
in mitigation to pursue governmental ends . . . .”).
149. Id. (“[R]egardless of whether the government ultimately succeeds in pressuring
someone into forfeiting a constitutional right, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine forbids
burdening the Constitution’s enumerated rights by coercively withholding benefits from those
who exercise them.”).
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the approval.150 If the landowner does not meet the conditions, then the
local government will deny approval, and that denial will fall under the
more lenient Penn Central test.151 Acknowledging that logic, both the
Water District in Koontz and the United Status as amicus curiae conceded
that a demand could amount to an unconstitutional condition even though
the local government never actually imposed that condition.152
This holding would amount to a “fix” only for addressing obvious
attempts to circumvent Nollan and Dolan. It presupposes a very specific
factual situation in which the agency clearly indicates its final set of
conditions and then requires the developer to meet them before the
agency would approve the project. It would not open the entire
negotiating process to claims of extortion.153
Furthermore, if an agency denies a project after a landowner opposes
unconstitutional conditions proposed by the public agency, then what is
the remedy? The twin Nollan and Dolan decisions required
compensation, but the compensation was for conditions that the
government entities actually imposed on the projects and that affected the
property at issue in those cases.154 By contrast, where the government
denies the project, it has taken nothing (assuming that its denial will not
fail the Penn Central test for general regulatory takings). Moreover, the
Court has long recognized that the Takings Clause does not substantively
constrain land use regulation; rather, it only requires compensation when
the regulation has resulted in a taking.155 The Court confirmed as much
150. See Timothy M. Mulvaney, Proposed Exactions, 26 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 277, 300
(2011) [hereinafter Mulvaney, Proposed Exactions] (recognizing, as part of an analysis of
proposed exactions, that applying the same test to all conceivable exactions, whether proposed
prior to an outright permit denial or imposed in a final development approval, “makes intuitive
sense” but ultimately rejecting this approach).
151. Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (outlining a
test determined by “[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the
extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations are, of
course, relevant considerations”).
152. Transcript of Oral Argument at 32, Koontz, 133 S. Ct. 2586 (No. 11-1147) (Mr. Wolfson
for Respondent: “[I]f the situation is really exactly the same like Nollan and Dolan, but the permit
is denied but it’s clear that it is a concrete—concrete condition, the landowner can go up through
the judicial review process and say, this is—you know, the denial of the permit application is
predicated on an unconstitutional condition, and you should set that aside”); id. at 50 (Mr.
Kneedler for the United States: “[W]e don’t think it matters whether the—whether it’s a permit
grant or permit denial. There was no actual taking in the sense compensation would be owed, but
it could be challenged as an unconstitutional condition under the Nollan and Dolan analysis”).
153. But see Echeverria, supra note 9, at 22–23 (arguing against such a distinction).
154. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 377 (1993); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483
U.S. 825, 827–28 (1986).
155. E.g., First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304, 315 (1986) (stating that the Takings Clause “is designed not to limit the governmental
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in its 2007 Lingle decision.156
This principle supplied the foundation for the Court’s earlier key
decision on the remedy required when a regulatory taking has occurred.
In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los
Angeles,157 the Court held that if a government regulation results in a
taking, the Fifth Amendment requires compensation for whatever period
the regulation was in place.158 The Court rejected the County’s argument
that once a court found a taking, the available remedy should only be
enjoining the regulation in the future.159 While the local government
could rescind the regulation, it still would have to compensate the
plaintiff for the interim period in which the taking was in effect.160
The holding also logically aligned with the Court’s takings decisions
explaining the doctrine of ripeness. A plaintiff can bring a takings case
only after the local government has definitively decided on a
development application.161 If that decision constituted a taking, then the
court could measure the damages only if the government had applied the
regulation specifically to the property.162
In sum, the case law under the Takings Clause has been concerned
principally with determining when a government action has crossed the
line into a taking and secondarily with whether the government’s action
was specific enough to calculate damages for the taking. Under the
extortion narrative, however, a primary purpose of the Takings Clause is
to prevent local governments from overreaching—from “extorting”
benefits from landowners, to use the Court’s terminology.163 Viewed
from that perspective, the range of potential remedies for a violation
interference with property rights per se, but rather to secure compensation in the event of
otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking”).
156. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 536 (2005).
157. 482 U.S. at 315.
158. Id. at 322.
159. Id. at 319–21.
160. Id. at 321 (“[W]here the government's activities have already worked a taking of all use
of property, no subsequent action by the government can relieve it of the duty to provide
compensation for the period during which the taking was effective.”); see also, e.g., Loretto v.
Manhattan Teleprompter CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 439 (1982) (requiring compensation even
though the taking involved a minute physical infringement on the property: the wiring for cable
television).
161. Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 186 (1985).
162. See Mark Fenster, Failed Exactions, 36 VT. L. REV. 623, 640 (2012) (“Only when the
agency has specified the exaction can a court know what property has or will be taken. Insofar as
the Fifth Amendment’s text requires property to be taken as a basis for just
compensation . . . , Nollan and Dolan require the identification and finalization of a condition as
a predicate to an exactions claim.”).
163. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2595 (2013)
(“Extortionate demands . . . frustrate the Fifth Amendment right to just compensation, and the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine prohibits them.”).
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widens. If an actual taking has occurred, damages are available. But a
local government may abuse its power by employing excessive leverage
during negotiations that occur before the government decides on a
development application.164 If so, no actual taking has yet occurred, but
a plaintiff has an opportunity to seek some sort of remedy for the
government’s overreaching.165
The Supreme Court held as much in Koontz,166 again showing the
reach of the extortion narrative. The Court recognized that no violation
of the Takings Clause occurred because the Water District never
approved the project—a point about the plaintiff’s request for damages
that had understandably “puzzled” the Florida Supreme Court.167
Nonetheless, in Koontz, Justice Alito reasoned: “Extortionate demands
for property in the land-use permitting context run afoul of the Takings
Clause not because they take property but because they impermissibly
burden the right not to have property taken without just compensation.”168
The Court continued that “the impermissible denial of a government
benefit is a constitutionally cognizable injury,” just as in other
unconstitutional conditions cases.169
This reasoning is consistent with the extortion narrative, even
employing language taken directly from it—“extortionate demands.” If
the function of the Takings Clause is to prevent those types of demands,
it implies the availability of a compensation remedy if they occur, even
if no actual taking occurs.
C. Deterrence and Non-deference
Acceptance of the extortion narrative has important implications for
how the Takings Clause affects judicial review and, relatedly, the
deference accorded to local decisions. Traditionally, courts view the
Takings Clause as requiring a case-by-case application of the facts in
individual cases. The general purpose of the judicial inquiry is to
determine whether the government has “singled out”170 an individual
landowner, under a particular set of facts, to bear burdens that society as
164. Brian T. Hodges, Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District and Its
Implications for Takings Law, 14 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 39, 41 (Oct. 2013)
(“[T]he Court’s decision to resolve Koontz under the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions will
provide aggrieved property owners with a cause of action that is substantively and procedurally
distinct cause from a regulatory takings claim.”); see supra notes 122–23 and accompanying text.
165. See Fenster, Failed Exactions, supra note 162, at 631–38 (discussing the small number
of “failed exaction” cases before Koontz).
166. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2596.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Penn Central Trans. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 131 (1978).
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a whole should bear.171 With respect to general regulatory takings, in
contrast to exaction takings, the outcome depends on a variety of
circumstances, as reflected in the Court’s multifactor general test for
takings established in Penn Central. Where governments impose
conditions, however, the Nollan and Dolan tests apply and are quite
dependent on specific facts.172
The extortion narrative proceeds differently. At its core, it assumes
that all local government entities will act in a way that unfairly burdens
landowners. That assumption, in turn, has led to a focus on rules whose
purpose is deterrence, not simply determining whether a right to
compensation exists in a specific factual situation. Thus, as discussed
above, in Koontz the Court was willing to employ the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine when the defendant public agency had not actually
taken property and when at least some uncertainty existed about the scope
of the conditions that the agency sought to impose.173 The goal was to
deter local overreaching.174
The deterrence theme is also evident from the Court’s placement of
the burden of proof. In Dolan, the Court placed the burden of proof on
the city to justify its actions under the rough proportionality test.175 This
holding departs from the traditional allocation of the burden of proof in
land use litigation, which situates that burden on the plaintiff.176 The
Court explained that the burden shifted because the local government was
making an adjudicative decision, an explanation unsupported by
traditional principles of land use law.177 But the new burden of proof rule
is consistent with the extortion narrative, which seeks to deter presumed
wrongdoing by local governments.
Another aspect of the focus on deterrence is a marked lessening in the
deference given to local decision-making. Longstanding principles of
judicial review call for courts to presume that governmental officials are

171. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (stating that the Takings Clause
was “designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear burdens which, in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole”).
172. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 392 (1994).
173. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2598 (“[W]e decline to reach respondent’s argument that its
demands for property were too indefinite to give rise to liability under Nollan and Dolan.”).
174. Id. at 2598–601.
175. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391 n.8.
176. Id.
177. See Jonathan M. Davidson, Ronald H. Rosenberg & Michael C. Spata, Negotiated
Development Denial Meets People’s Court: Del Monte Dunes Brings New Wild Cards to
Exactions Law, 31 URB. LAW. 831, 835 (1999) (noting the traditional allocation of the burden of
proof on the challenger in land use cases).
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acting correctly in exercising discretion legally assigned to them.178
While deference has not been a particular theme in takings cases, the
Court has in some instances expressed concern about intruding on local
governments’ land use powers.179 Such deference, however, is
inconsistent with the idea that local governments are extorting property
from landowners. Because the extortion narrative views the local
governments’ imposition of conditions as suspect, deference becomes
inappropriate. In its place, the Court substitutes distrust and enhanced
scrutiny.180
Moreover, the rejection of deference operates without regard to the
actual motives of local officials. Dissenting in Dolan, Justice Stevens
would have found a taking only if the regulatory action was “so grossly
disproportionate” to the proposed development’s adverse effects that it
“manifests motives other than land use regulation on the part of the
city.”181 The acceptance of the extortion narrative obviates any need for
inquiry into the motives or good faith of local officials.
Taken as a whole, the twin features of deterrence and non-deference
rearrange the traditional institutional relationship between courts and
local governments. They also call for takings rules that differ
fundamentally from those applied in a deferential relationship.182

178. Daniel R. Mandelker & A. Dan Tarlock, Shifting the Presumption of Constitutionality
in Land Use Law, 24 URB. LAW. 1, 1 (1992) (“Land-use decisions are either local administrative
or legislative decisions, both of which are generally accorded a formal presumption of rationality
and constitutionality.”).
179. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 737–38 (2006) (“Even if the phrase ‘the
waters of the United States’ were ambiguous as applied to intermittent flows, our own canons of
construction would establish that the Corps’ interpretation of the statute is impermissible. As we
noted in SWANCC [Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531
U.S. 159 (2001)], the Government’s expansive interpretation would ‘result in a significant
impingement of the States’ traditional and primary power over land and water use.’ Regulation of
land use, as through the issuance of the development permits sought by petitioners in both of these
cases, is a quintessential state and local power.” (citation omitted)). The Court has explicitly noted
deference in cases under the “public use” clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Kelo v. City of New
London, 545 U.S. 469, 480 (2005) (“The disposition of this case therefore turns on the question
whether the City’s development plan serves a ‘public purpose.’ Without exception, our cases have
defined that concept broadly, reflecting our longstanding policy of deference to legislative
judgments in this field.”).
180. See Fennell & Peñalver, supra note 9, at 336 (“[The Court] wanted to leave intact all
monetary impositions related to land except extortionate ones. But sifting through every
imposition to identify the bad ones is no trivial exercise; it involves a significant recalibration of
the relationship between federal courts and other government actors.”).
181. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 403 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
182. In this sense, the lack of deference that the extortion narrative calls for leads directly to
the Court’s adoption of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. See infra Section III.D.
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D. Effects on Planning and Bargaining
Two important features of modern land use law are planning and
bargaining. The extortion narrative affects both, but it does so in quite
different ways that intersect with the lack of deference just discussed.
The principal assumption of the extortion narrative—unchecked
actions by local officials pose significant risks to landowners—has led
the Court to adopt more stringent tests circumscribing the discretion
exercised by those officials. In particular, the rough proportionality test
places the burden of proof on the city and, as a practical matter, requires
more specific calculations about the relationship between a project’s
impact and a mitigation condition.183 In other words, the effect is to
require more planning by local officials.
In a number of important cases, the Supreme Court and some state
supreme courts have recognized the importance of planning to address
land use problems by affording some deference toward those efforts.184
In Dolan, Chief Justice William Rehnquist even referred to the
“commendable task of land use planning.”185 At the same time, however,
land use planning is not an entirely neutral exercise. The fact-finding
component of planning does rely on objective technical expertise
grounded in professional competence, but the ultimate adoption of
policies in land use plans is largely a political choice, albeit one
constrained by state statutes.186 The Court might well conclude that the
183. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 403 (“The Court’s assurances that its ‘rough proportionality’
test leaves ample room for cities to pursue the ‘commendable task of land use planning,’ even
twice avowing that ‘[n]o precise mathematical calculation is required,’ are wanting given the
result that test compels here.” (citation omitted)).
184. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 483 (“The City has carefully formulated an economic
development plan that it believes will provide appreciable benefits to the community, including—
but by no means limited to—new jobs and increased tax revenue. As with other exercises in urban
planning and development, the City is endeavoring to coordinate a variety of commercial,
residential, and recreational uses of land, with the hope that they will form a whole greater than
the sum of its parts.” (footnote omitted)); Golden v. Planning Bd., 285 N.E.2d 291, 296 (N.Y.
1972) (“The undisputed effect of these integrated efforts in land use planning and development is
to provide an over-all program of orderly growth and adequate facilities through a sequential
development policy commensurate with progressing availability and capacity of public
facilities.”); Nicole Stelle Garnett, Planning as Public Use?, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 443, 444 (2007)
(suggesting that planning is a type of “safe harbor” after Kelo).
185. 512 U.S. at 396 (majority opinion) (noting that land use planning is “made necessary
by increasing urbanization, particularly in metropolitan areas such as Portland”).
186. See JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING AND
DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW § 3:5 (3d ed. 2013) (noting that local governments generally
possess zoning power, and therefore many factors can influence the power); Alejandro Esteban
Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: A Collaborative Model for Fostering Equality,
Community Involvement and Adaptive Planning in Land Use Decisions: Installment One, 24
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 9–13 (2005) (discussing zoning history).
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chosen planning policies would reflect the underlying power imbalance
assumed by the extortion narrative and thus that planning does not
deserve the deference often accorded it in the past.187 In some sense, that
is precisely what Dolan did by adopting the rough proportionality
standard and finding that existing planning for traffic was insufficient.188
In short, the extortion narrative cuts two ways with respect to
planning. It impels the adoption of more precise and narrower tests, a
consequence that encourages—if not demands—more comprehensive
planning. At the same time, the Court may view the outcome of that
planning as suspect and thus not entitled to deference. Perhaps the
language in Nollan reflects or at least prefigures the Court’s attitude. The
Court held that a condition unrelated to the purpose that would allow a
development ban becomes “an out-and-out plan of extortion.”189
A second feature of modern land use law is bargaining between public
agencies and developers. Municipalities and developers are strongly
inclined to negotiate solutions to issues raised by land use proposals.190
Developers would like to avoid the uncertainty associated with the
regulatory approval process and perhaps prevent litigation, while local
officials perceive opportunities to obtain negotiated benefits for their
municipality.191
The extortion narrative has important implications for such
bargaining. A significant factor in the outcomes reached by bargaining is

187. See Mulvaney, Remnants of Exaction Takings, supra note 108, at 194 (noting that the
Dolan Court “declared that the federal Takings Clause placed limits on the deference afforded to
governments' imposition of certain development conditions”).
188. 512 U.S. at 391, 395 (“But on the record before us, the city has not met its burden of
demonstrating that the additional number of vehicle and bicycle trips generated by petitioner's
development reasonably relate to the city's requirement for a dedication of the pedestrian/bicycle
pathway easement. The city simply found that the creation of the pathway ‘could offset some of
the traffic demand . . . and lessen the increase in traffic congestion.’”).
189. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (emphasis added) (quoting
J.E.D. Assocs., Inc. v. Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14 (N.H. 1981), overruled by Town of Auburn v.
McEvoy, 553 A.2d 317, 320–21 (N.H. 1988) (“To the extent, then, that J.E.D. Associates, Inc. v.
Town of Atkinson may be read to exempt constitutional property claims from the demands of the
appellate process . . . it is overruled.”)).
190. See David L. Callies & Julie A. Tappendorf, Unconstitutional Land Development
Conditions and the Development Agreement Solution: Bargaining for Public Facilities After
Nollan and Dolan, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 663, 663 (2001) (“Formal agreements between
landowners and local government respecting the use of land have increased substantially over the
past twenty-five years.”); Mulvaney, Exactions for the Future, supra note 143, at 524–25
(examining a hypothetical and concluding that both the developer and the city had incentives to
negotiate).
191. Mulvaney, Exactions for the Future, supra note 143, at 524–25.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016

31

Florida Law Review, Vol. 68, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 6

354

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

the bargaining power that a party brings to the negotiating table.192 The
extortion narrative presumes that local officials have considerable power
and will unfairly use it to coerce developers. Thus, the narrative views
the bargaining process as suspect, and one would expect that a court
following the narrative would shape takings law to discourage
bargaining.
The Court fulfilled that expectation in Koontz. It concluded that the
Water District used its bargaining leverage to impose a “take it or leave
it” demand upon the developer—a factual conclusion that corresponds to
the extortion narrative—and then denied the project when the developer
refused that demand.193 The Court’s discussion of the negotiating process
in the case leaves no doubt that it saw the process as tainted.
By applying the unconstitutional conditions doctrine even though the
Water District had never actually approved the project,194 the Court
erected obstacles in the path of negotiated solutions to land use proposals.
Under the holding, negotiations over project approvals can turn into
violations of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine even if the parties
never reach an agreement. Indeed, some have suggested that those
obstacles to negotiated solutions are insurmountable,195 arguing that
landowners could later use the negotiations to prove a violation of the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine and perhaps to support an award of
damages.196 Some cautious municipalities may decide that, given the
risks of liability, they simply will not bargain for conditions that might
violate the essential nexus and rough proportionality standards of Nollan
and Dolan. If so, it is conceivable that local governments will deny more
projects outright because of unavoidable, adverse environmental impacts.

192. See Daniel D. Barnhizer, Inequality of Bargaining Power, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 139,
150 (2005) (“Bargaining power disparities . . . can affect the ability of the ‘weak’ party to obtain
its preferred terms in a contractual interaction with a ‘strong’ party.”).
193. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2593 (2013) (“The
District considered the 11–acre conservation easement to be inadequate, and it informed petitioner
that it would approve construction only if he agreed to one of two concessions.”).
194. Id. at 2591, 2595.
195. The Florida Supreme Court in Koontz suggested that to avoid potential liability for
actions during negotiations, agencies will respond by “opt[ing] to simply deny permits outright
without discussion or negotiation rather than risk the crushing costs of litigation.” St. Johns River
Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 77 So. 3d 1220, 1231 (Fla. 2011), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013).
196. Tappendorf & DiCianni, supra note 1, at 471 (“In the back-and-forth process of
negotiations over land use permits, whenever the government makes a request that the developer
does not like, the developer now has the option to drop out of the negotiations and bring a lawsuit
against the government for making unconstitutional demands.”); see also Sean F. Nolon,
Bargaining for Development Post-Koontz: How the Supreme Court Invaded Local Government,
67 FLA. L. REV. 171, 205 (2015) (examining why Koontz makes land use negotiations less
efficient).
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However, because the mutual benefits to bargaining are substantial,
the parties to land use negotiations are strongly incentivized to devise a
way of negotiating that circumvents the obstacles erected by the Court.
They likely will mutually agree to conditions under which bargaining can
occur without potential municipal liability if the bargaining fails.
Furthermore, municipalities will strive to structure the positions that they
take in bargaining to prevent their use later in litigation, particularly by
avoiding any characterization of those positions as demands. So
bargaining will continue, although in a more careful, structured, and
lawyer-supervised fashion than before.
The remaining question about bargaining is whether Koontz will alter
the substantive scope of the negotiated agreements that the parties reach.
In the past, the general consensus among practitioners was that parties
could reach agreements under which developers would provide benefits
exceeding those that a municipality could constitutionally impose under
Nollan and Dolan.197 The theory was that by voluntarily agreeing to those
conditions, developers waived any right to claim that the conditions
constituted a taking.198
By accepting the extortion narrative, Koontz casts some doubt on this
practice. The decision heightens the uncertainty about whether, or under
what circumstances, developers can voluntarily waive their right to
contest unconstitutional conditions and whether municipalities may rely
on such waivers. Certainly one can envision an argument in later
litigation that courts should not recognize such waivers because
municipalities leveraged them, an argument fully consistent with the
extortion narrative.
E. De-compartmentalizing Takings Law
As the discussion above has shown, the extortion narrative as
implemented has changed the purpose and features of exaction takings
law.199 It could, however, operate even more broadly.
The obvious example is the potential for further extension beyond real
property of the takings doctrine governing exactions. The courts and
commentators had split on whether the Nollan and Dolan decisions were
based on the local governments’ attempt to exact interests in real property
197. See David L. Callies & Glenn H. Sonoda, Providing Infrastructure for Smart Growth:
Land Development Conditions, 43 IDAHO L. REV. 351, 405 (2007) (providing the example of a
Hawaii planning statute).
198. See id. at 404 (asserting that development agreements can go further because it “is in
theory a voluntary agreement which neither government nor landowner is compelled to either
negotiate or execute”).
199. See Alexander, supra note 97, at 1772 (“Connecting the narratives and counternarratives of power in land-use regulation with . . . deeper political visions illuminates
methodological arguments.”).
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from the developers in those cases.200 One could certainly read the
opinion in Nollan to support the narrower interpretation because it
emphasized that, if the California Coastal Commission had taken an
easement directly without paying for it, the Fifth Amendment would
demand compensation.201 If the two decisions were based on the type of
property taken—real property—this fact compartmentalized their
reach.202 In turn, this perceived limitation led some commentators to label
Nollan and Dolan as relatively narrow decisions.203
The decision in Lingle seemed to support this reading.204 Both cases,
said Lingle, “began with the premise that, had the government simply
appropriated the easement in question, this would have been a per se
physical taking.”205 Moreover, to date, the exaction cases have occupied
a sphere of takings law distinct from general regulatory takings, such as
when the government rezones property and greatly reduces its value. The
decisions of whether those actions constitute takings, it is agreed, fall
under a different sphere of takings law occupied by the Penn Central
multifactor balancing test.206
Compartmentalizing the takings cases in this fashion, however, results
in certain anomalies. For one, Dolan shifted the burden of proof to the
government on the imposition of conditions that could result in a
taking.207 However, the burden remains on the plaintiff in general
regulatory takings cases subject to the Penn Central test.208 Moreover,
the routine types of conditions placed on developments by municipal
ordinances, such as setback provisions and parking requirements, also
effectively “take” property from the landowner.209 Their status is now
200. See generally W. Andrew Gowder Jr., When Do the Nollan and Dolan Rules Apply to
the Regulation and Development of Land Use?, 65 PLAN. & ENVTL. L. 4 (2013) (discussing the
split in the case law).
201. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 830–31 (1987).
202. See Alto Eldorado P’ship v. County of Santa Fe, 634 F.3d 1170, 1175 (10th Cir. 2011)
(holding that Nollan and Dolan were a “‘sub-category’ of physical per se takings”).
203. Fenster, Failed Exactions, supra note 162, at 630 (“The exactions decisions constitute
a narrow, unique category that operates, both factually and doctrinally, as a distinct inquiry that
lies between the per se takings categories and the default balancing test.”).
204. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 547 (2004).
205. Id. at 546.
206. Id.
207. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 391, 391 n.8 (1994).
208. Fenster, Failed Exactions, supra note 162, at 628 (“[T]he Court usually follows the
‘principal guidelines’ and default approach for resolving regulatory takings claims established in
Penn Central.” (footnote omitted)).
209. See, e.g., Norman Cheng, “If a Policeman Must Know the Constitution, Then Why Not
a Planner?” A Constitutional Challenge of the Hawai’i Public Access Statute, 23 U. HAW. L.
REV. 409, 424 (2000); Gwynne Hunter, Note, Severance v. Patterson: How Do Property Rights
Move When the Dynamic Sea Meets the Static Shore?, 40 ECOLOGY L.Q. 271, 295 n.178 (2013).
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clouded with some uncertainty.
Perhaps more importantly, this type of compartmentalization between
exaction takings and general regulatory takings seems unrelated to the
actual burden imposed on landowners in specific cases. A land use
regulation (say, a rezoning) could cause a very large diminution in the
value of a landowner’s property, perhaps as much as ninety percent or
more, but not constitute a taking under Penn Central.210 By contrast, a
required dedication of real property could effect a taking under Nollan
and Dolan even though it was quite small and had little actual impact on
a development (and perhaps even resulted in a benefit to the
landowner).211 Indeed, Nollan found that requiring the dedication of an
easement over part of a beach was a taking, but requiring the landowner
to maintain a view site on the property—to most landowners, a greater
infringement on their rights—would not be.212
Doctrinal distinctions may justify these types of disparities caused by
the compartmentalization of land use doctrine.213 The extortion narrative,
however, looks at takings scenarios through the very different, overriding
lens of protecting the landowner from government overreaching. That
perspective would place little importance on the method by which local
governments impose the regulation—by exaction or through direct
regulation—but would instead focus on responding to the government
overreaching.
Thus, with Koontz having freed takings law from its tether to real
property and from any requirement that the government actually adopt
the exaction, the extortion narrative could now justify decompartmentalizing takings law to provide wider protection against
government extortion.214 For example, a downzoning that greatly
210. See, e.g., Mark W. Cordes, The Effect of Palazzolo v. Rhode Island on Takings and
Environmental Land Use Regulation, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 337, 341–42 (2003) (“[C]ourts
have typically required diminution in value of a property far exceeding fifty percent, and closer
to ninety percent, before takings are found.”).
211. Certainly the landowner in Dolan would benefit from the overall bike path, and the
landowner in Nollan would benefit from the series of easements across the ocean side of various
other properties. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 378; Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 828
(1987).
212. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836 (“[T]he condition would be constitutional even if it consisted
of the requirement that the Nollans provide a viewing spot on their property for passersby with
whose sighting of the ocean their new house would interfere.”).
213. Mulvaney, Remnants of Exaction Takings, supra note 108, at 217 (noting that limited
judicial scrutiny of development application denials matched with Nollan and Dolan’s heightened
scrutiny of granted permits with conditions “can diminish the efficiency and effectiveness of land
use regulation”).
214. See Fennell & Peñalver, supra note 9, at 288 (“By beating back one form of exactions
creep—the possibility that local governments will circumvent a too narrowly drawn circle of
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diminishes the value of property, perhaps to preserve the rural
atmosphere of a local jurisdiction, could appear as more “extortionate”
than a condition merely requiring the dedication of an easement over part
of the landowner’s property. Viewing the downzoning through the lens
of extortionate leveraging would provide a rationale for collapsing the
distinction in current law between conditional takings through exactions
and general regulatory takings. During the Koontz oral argument, Chief
Justice John Roberts asked, perhaps presciently: “Do you know of any
case where the government has lost a Penn Central case?”215 This
question may well imply his skepticism about whether the Penn Central
test for general regulatory takings sufficiently constrains local regulators.
In short, the extortion narrative has already driven the Koontz decision
to break through prior doctrinal walls. It could impel even more farreaching changes.
IV. THE EXTORTION NARRATIVE AS A RATIONALIZING POSTULATE FOR
TAKINGS DOCTRINE
A majority of the Court has now adopted the extortion narrative, and
the Court’s opinions, particularly Koontz, reflect its influence. Those
opinions, however, have not developed the concept of extortion or
explained how it could operate as a motivating postulate for the continued
evolution of exactions takings law. Instead, the Court merely assumed the
existence of extortion and made almost no effort to further support or
explain the idea. Further, the narrative has received little scrutiny from
others outside the Court, although litigators seeking to expand takings
law have certainly emphasized it. Given the growing importance of the
extortion narrative as reflected in the Court’s opinions, this Part analyzes
whether it is a concept capable of supporting the further restructuring of
takings law.
A. The Literal Charge of Extortionate Behavior
A logical starting place is an examination of the concept of extortion
itself. Extortion is an accusation with extremely negative connotations; it
is viewed as a serious, highly immoral crime of corruption.216 In a 1992
case, the Court described it as “the rough equivalent of what we would
heightened scrutiny—the Court has left land use regulation vulnerable to the creeping expansion
of heightened scrutiny under the auspices of its exactions jurisprudence.”).
215. Transcript of Oral Argument at 29, Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133
S. Ct. 2586 (2013) (No. 11-1447).
216. See James Lindgren, The Theory, History, and Practice of the Bribery-Extortion
Distinction, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1695, 1696 (1993) (describing extortion by a public official as
“the seeking or receiving of a corrupt benefit paid under an implicit or explicit threat to give the
payor worse than fair treatment”).
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now describe as ‘taking a bribe.’”217 Extortion is not a charge brought
lightly, yet that was exactly what the Court accused the California Coastal
Commission of in Nollan.218 There, the Court concluded that if the
regulatory condition imposed on a project was unrelated to the impact
that would have allowed the Coastal Commission to disapprove the
project entirely, then imposing that condition amounted to “an out-andout plan of extortion.”219 The Court’s later repetition of the extortion
charge demonstrates that its use was deliberate, not merely one-time,
colorful verbiage.
Was the charge merited? The federal Hobbs Act defines extortion as
“the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by
wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under
color of official right.”220 Thus, a 1947 case from the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that a person was guilty of
extortion under color of office if he “demanded and received money or a
thing of value to which he was not entitled.”221 Public officials certainly
can commit extortion, and one might posit that, using the definition in the
Hobbs Act, local governments are wrongfully obtaining property under
color of their official authority. Furthermore, the definition of extortion
in Black’s Law Dictionary might seem to apply in the context of land use
exactions: “The offense committed by a public official who illegally
obtains property under the color of office; esp., an official’s collection of
an unlawful fee.”222
Nonetheless, a 2007 Supreme Court case demonstrates that the facts
in Nollan could not have led to a conclusion of extortion. In Wilkie v.
Robbins,223 a landowner claimed that federal land management officials
were trying to extort a right-of-way from him.224 He alleged that the
agents intended to obtain the right-of-way by carrying out and threatening
various administrative actions.225 The Court rejected the extortion charge,
217. Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 260 (1992).
218. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
219. Id. (quoting J.E.D. Assocs., Inc. v. Town of Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14 (N.H. 1981)).
220. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (2006).
221. United States v. Sutter, 260 F.2d 754, 756 (7th Cir. 1947); see also United States v.
Urban, 404 F.3d 754, 768 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting that under the Hobbs Act, “the Government need
only show that a public official has obtained a payment to which he was not entitled, knowing
that the payment was made in return for official acts”); Ian Ayres, The Twin Faces of Judicial
Corruption: Extortion and Bribery, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 1231, 1235 (1997) (discussing the
distinction between bribery and extortion, and noting that extortion is “whether the defendant was
paying to . . . avoid worse than fair treatment”).
222. Extortion, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
223. Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537 (2007).
224. Id. at 548.
225. Id. at 544.
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reasoning that “[t]he Hobbs Act does not apply when the National
Government is the intended beneficiary of the allegedly extortionate
acts.”226 It cited “the importance of the line between public and private
beneficiaries” for extortion both under the Hobbs Act and at common
law.227 Thus, because the defendants’ actions in Wilkie were intended to
benefit the government rather than them personally, extortion did not
apply.228 The same logic would apply to the vast majority, if not all, local
government actions imposing conditions under the land use regulatory
process.
Moreover, the extortion claim fails for another reason. In Nollan, once
the Court concluded that the Coastal Commission’s actions did not meet
the essential nexus test, the Court immediately labeled the totality of the
actions “an out-and-out plan of extortion.”229 Thus, the Court seemed to
say that even if a local government applied the essential nexus test in
good faith, a judicial determination that the government was wrong
immediately converts the government action into extortion. The language
in Nollan admits no middle ground, rejecting the possibility that a local
government could, in good faith, adopt a condition that a court later finds
is excessive under Nollan or Dolan.
This concept of extortion per se is plainly insupportable. The Court’s
use of the word extortion in the takings context takes no account of
whether the local officials were acting in good faith or were attempting
to follow the law.230 Yet neither Nollan’s essential nexus test nor Dolan’s
rough proportionality test is perfectly precise; courts, not to mention local
governments, have disagreed over whether the tests were met in
particular instances.231 Mistakenly applying these tests does not
automatically equate to intentional extortion.232
226. Id. at 563.
227. Id. at 564.
228. Id. at 565.
229. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (quoting J.E.D. Assocs., Inc.
v. Town of Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14 (N.H. 1981)).
230. See William A. Fischel, From Nectow to Koontz: The Supreme Court’s Supervision of
Land-Use Regulation 44 (July 25, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2471906 (“The possibility of
extortionate motives
for
regulation . . . seems pretty remote in [Nollan, Dolan, and Koontz].”).
231. See Breemer, supra note 136, at 375 n.13, 395–96. In Dolan, Justice David Souter’s
dissent persuasively argued that the city’s conditions violated the nexus requirement in Nollan.
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 411–12 (1994) (Souter, J., dissenting). The majority found
the Nollan nexus requirement satisfied. Id. at 387 (majority opinion).
232. An analogous situation arose in Landgate, Inc. v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 953 P.2d 1188
(1998). In that case, the Coastal Commission erred in concluding that it had jurisdiction over a
lot-line adjustment, resulting in a two-year delay in development on the property. Id. at 1190,
1193. The court held that such an error did not automatically result in a taking under the Fifth
Amendment. Id. at 1190.
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Indeed, the facts of Nollan illustrate how the immediate conclusion of
“an out-and-out plan of extortion” is unsustainable. In that case, Justice
Scalia assumed that a new beach house could have caused impacts on the
inland side of the house.233 Individuals who drove by would be unable to
see the beach and would not realize that they had a right to use that
beach.234 Thus, reasoned the Court, a condition directed to that impact,
such as requiring a view area on the property, would be sufficiently
related to the impact to pass constitutional muster.235 But the condition
actually adopted by the Commission, a lateral easement on the beachside
of the house that crossed part of the beach above the high-tide mark, was
unrelated to the view impact.236 Therefore, it amounted to “an out-andout plan of extortion.”237
However, the Court reached this conclusion only because it chose to
define the impact of the house more narrowly than the California courts
had in finding no taking.238 If the impact were termed an effect on
“access” generally, not just access from the road, then the condition
imposed by the California Coastal Commission would have passed the
Nollan test. So the conclusion of extortion came about only because of
the Court’s decision in the case, which at least clarified and may well
have changed preexisting law. In other words, if the California Coastal
Commission implemented “an out-and-out plan of extortion” in imposing
the easement condition, it was a type of after-the-fact extortion that
resulted from the reasoning of the five-person majority in Nollan. Four
dissenting Justices would have found no taking.239
The Court thus leveled the denigrating charge of extortion based on
assumed extortionate motives by local government officials, a conclusion
illustrated by the example Justice Scalia used to explain the essential
nexus rule in Nollan. He began by recognizing that a ban on shouting
“fire” in a theater is an exercise of the police power that can pass the
stringent standards for regulation of speech.240 However, requiring a $100
233. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 838.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 841.
237. Id. at 837 (quoting J.E.D. Assocs., Inc. v. Town of Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14 (N.H.
1981)); see Richard A. Epstein, How to Solve (or Avoid) the Exactions Problem, 72 MO. L. REV.
973, 985 (2007) (“In [Justice Scalia’s] view, the state’s legitimate interest was solely to protect
the ‘viewing spot’ for those who wish to look over the landowner’s property. Unfortunately, the
lateral [beach-side] interest was not related to that objective . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
238. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 839 (“Our conclusion on this point is consistent with the approach
taken by every other court . . . with the exception of the California state courts.”).
239. See id. at 843 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 865 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 866
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall joined Justice Brennan’s dissent. Id. at 843.
240. Id. at 837 (majority opinion).
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payment to allow a shout of “fire” changes everything.241 Adding the
unrelated payment condition alters the purpose to one that, “while it may
be legitimate, is inadequate to sustain the ban,” which now becomes
extortion.242 So even if a government agency has a legitimate purpose,
that purpose automatically transmutes into an illegitimate, extortionate
one because its action fails the essential nexus test.243
To summarize, the extortion narrative does not rest on literal proof of
extortion, as the Court’s own decisions have defined that term. Rather,
extortion is automatically assumed when local governments fail the tests
in Nollan and Dolan, even if they have acted in good faith in applying
those tests. The extortion narrative lacks confirmation from the facts of
Nollan, the case in which it originated. The charge was and remains a
verbal construct inappropriately employing a serious criminal allegation
to reach a per se conclusion.
B. Unconstitutional Conditions as an Empty Label
A second underpinning of the extortion narrative, as it has developed
in the Court’s exaction cases, is the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine.244 The doctrine relates intimately to the extortion narrative
because both are based on improper coercion. The Court sees the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine as embodying a logical and
proportional response to the extortion narrative, and the question now
becomes whether the doctrine can fulfill that role. The answer is that it
cannot.
The Court first announced in Dolan that its holdings there and in
Nollan reflected a “special application” of the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine.245 Then, in Koontz, the Court explained that by granting a
conditional permit, “the government can pressure an owner into
voluntarily giving up property for which the Fifth Amendment would
otherwise require just compensation.”246 The reference to pressure
corresponds to the underlying premises of the extortion narrative. So the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine generally deals with situations where
241. Id.
242. Id. (emphasis added).
243. See Alan Romero, Two Constitutional Theories for Invalidating Extortionate Exactions,
78 NEB. L. REV. 348, 353 (1999) (“[T]he lack of nexus . . . converts that purpose to something
other than what it was.”).
244. See Been, supra note 112, at 475 (“The Nollan Court’s concern that land use regulators
will ‘extort’ property owners has its roots in the allegations of coercion and illicit motive that long
have animated judicial and academic debate about exactions and more generally, about the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine.”).
245. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 547 (2004) (quoting Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994)).
246. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2594 (2013).
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the government requires a waiver of a constitutional right to gain a
benefit, and the Court sees that same situation in the exactions area.
The Court thus views the unconstitutional conditions doctrine as
offering a responsive, unifying principle that supports the reshaping of
the constitutional law of exactions to deter “extorted” conditions. As a
result, the doctrine has been cited as the “logical underpinning” of
constitutional exactions law,247 and one commentator describes the entire
field of exactions law as now falling under the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine.248 Another even sees a violation of the doctrine occurring “the
moment the government makes an unlawful demand.”249
For a number of reasons, however, the doctrine cannot supply the
support needed for the extortion narrative. First, the doctrine itself has
been the subject of extensive scholarship, which has generally concluded
that it lacks logical cohesion.250 It may operate as a “metadoctrine”251 or
“overarching principle”252 preventing government coercion in various
situations, but its rationale has never been clear.253 Thus, while the Court
in Dolan referred to the doctrine as “well-settled,”254 that statement is
inaccurate and has been derided in scholarship.255 Most recently, scholars
247. Tappendorf & DiCianni, supra note 1, at 456.
248. See Fenster, Substantive Due Process, supra note 9, at 415 (“The entire field of
exactions now, apparently, falls under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine rather than the
Takings Clause.”).
249. Hodges, supra note 164, at 42 (“[T]he demand itself causes the injury . . . .”).
250. E.g., Been, supra note 112, at 486; Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without Baselines:
Unconstitutional Conditions in Three Dimensions, 90 GEO. L. J. 1, 3 (2001); Philip Hamburger,
Unconstitutional Conditions: The Irrelevance of Consent, 98 VA. L. REV. 479, 480 (2012);
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1415–16 (1989);
Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Is an Anachronism (with
Particular Reference to Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REV. 593, 594 (1990); see
also Jason Mazzone, The Waiver Paradox, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 801, 802 (2003) (noting that the
doctrine of criminal waiver and the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions “involve exactly the
same fundamental issue” but “deal with the same problem in very different ways”).
251. Frederick Schauer, Too Hard: Unconstitutional Conditions and the Chimera of
Constitutional Consistency, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 989, 1001–02 (1995) (“[T]he unconstitutional
conditions doctrine is not itself a substantive doctrine, but a metadoctrine applied to a number of
different substantive doctrines, such as freedom of speech, freedom of religion, equal protection,
and procedural due process.”).
252. Fenster, Substantive Due Process, supra note 9, at 407 (quoting Koontz v. St. Johns
River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2594 (2013)).
253. See Daniel L. Siegel, Exactions After Lingle: How Basing Nollan and Dolan on the
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Limits Their Scope, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 577, 609–10,
610 nn.160–61 (2009) (cataloguing quotes about the doctrine’s deficiencies).
254. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994).
255. See, e.g., Jan G. Laitos, Causation and the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine: Why
the City of Tigard’s Exaction Was a Taking, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 893, 893–94 (1995) (“[T]he
Court is wrong when it categorizes the unconstitutional conditions doctrine as being ‘well-settled.’
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have suggested that the lack of underlying cohesion has so fragmented
the doctrine that it takes different forms depending on the specific
constitutional provision at issue—freedom of speech, freedom of
association, or here, takings.256 Thus, the doctrine’s lack of coherence and
logical weakness are well established.257
Second, the Court has never attempted to explain either the contours
of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine in the takings area or how the
doctrine melds with explanations of the takings doctrine in the Court’s
exactions cases.258 The Court made no mention of unconstitutional
conditions in Nollan and merely referred to the doctrine in passing in
Dolan.259 Moreover, the issue raised in Dolan was the closeness of the
relationship between the exaction condition and the impact of the project
that the condition was mitigating.260 The question whether the city had
gone too far in adopting such mitigation is a narrower question than the
one normally seen in the Court’s unconstitutional conditions cases:
Whether the government has any power to require a recipient to waive a
constitutional right to receive a benefit.261
Finally, in Koontz, the doctrine played a central role in the decision
given that no actual taking had occurred, but the Court again offered no
real explanation of it. The Court cited “two realities of the permitting
process,” but never explained their relationship to the doctrine.262
Given the important role that exactions play in local government land
use decisions, the Court’s discussion to date of the unconstitutional
It is a doctrine that has been inconsistently applied over time, varying with the nature of the right
the government wants the private party to waive.”).
256. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 250, at 5 (“[U]nconstitutional conditions theorizing over
the past decade has tended to occupy narrower conceptual spaces. In place of the attempts to
provide a unified theory of unconstitutional conditions across diverse doctrinal categories,
scholars have offered descriptive and prescriptive theories of unconstitutional conditions limited
to particular subject areas, with speech, religion, abortion, takings, plea bargaining, public
assistance, and federal funding for states all generating substantial literatures.”).
257. See id. at 3 (“The Supreme Court's failure to provide coherent guidance on the subject
[i.e. unconstitutional conditions] is, alas, legendary.”).
258. As one commentator aptly put it, “While the unconstitutional conditions doctrine—such
as it is—plays an important role in defining the vocabulary that courts use in explaining the
constitutional limits on exactions, it is unclear what work the doctrine actually does.” Justin R.
Pidot, Fees, Expenditures, and the Takings Clause, 41 ECOLOGY L.Q. 131, 147 (2014).
259. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385.
260. See Laitos, supra note 255, at 893.
261. Id. at 895 (“[T]he Dolan case is not, in fact, an unconstitutional conditions case. It is a
takings case.”).
262. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2594–95 (2013) (“The
first [reality] is that land-use permit applicants are especially vulnerable to the type of coercion
that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine prohibits,” and the second reality is that “many
proposed land uses threaten to impose costs on the public that dedications of property can
offset.”).
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conditions doctrine cannot justify its expansion of takings law in this
field. Indeed, it is unclear why the doctrine’s use in the exactions field is,
as the Court stated, a “special application” of it.263 Readers are left instead
with what is essentially an empty label for a conclusion, not a principled
doctrine. Coercion was certainly at work in previous Court holdings
applying the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to other constitutional
rights, and coercion is at work here in the exactions area, according to the
Court. More is necessary, however, to explain why the doctrine is
appropriate for exactions.264
For example, confusion exists over what “right” is burdened when the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine applies in the exactions situation. In
Koontz, Justice Alito declared that the Water District’s demand
(assuming there was one) “impermissibly burden[ed] the right not to have
property taken without just compensation.”265 Others have suggested that
exactions can impermissibly burden the “right to develop property”266 or
“to use . . . property,”267 which are constitutional rights not widely
discussed in case law. Moreover, any rights to develop or use property
are only indirectly related to the Takings Clause.268 This confusion
strongly suggests a doctrine detached from any constitutional base.
However, an even larger problem exists. The unconstitutional
conditions doctrine addresses situations in which the government
requires that an individual forfeit some constitutional right to gain a
benefit from the government.269 Put in terms of the extortion narrative,
263. Id. at 2594 (quoting Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 547 (2005)).
264. The Court’s use of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine in the exactions field simply
does not compare to the quality of its other work in Nollan. There, the Court carefully explained
the origins of local government power to condition land use approvals on exactions and then
defined the parameters of that authority in terms of a principle: If a local government had authority
to deny a permit, then it had some authority, within bounds, to approve a permit with conditions
addressed to the same impacts that would have supported denial. While the Court did use the
language of extortion, the explanation of the rationale for the authority to condition was logical
and clear. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 834–37 (1987).
265. 133 S. Ct. at 2596; see also Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994) (“[T]he
government may not require a person to give up a constitutional right—here the right to receive
just compensation when property is taken for a public use—in exchange for a discretionary benefit
conferred by the government where the benefit sought has little or no relationship to the
property.”).
266. Tappendorf & DiCianni, supra note 1, at 457 (suggesting that the benefit withheld under
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is “[t]he right to develop property”).
267. James S. Burling & Graham Owen, The Implications of Lingle on Inclusionary Zoning
and Other Legislative and Monetary Exactions, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 397, 412–13 (2009) (“To
the extent that the ability to use private property is a fundamental right, the requirement that a
landowner seeking to develop property give up land or money in order to subsidize housing for
unrelated third parties is a problematic proposition.” (footnote omitted)).
268. See Somin, supra note 9, at 240.
269. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2595.
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local governments are “trying to force property owners to surrender their
Takings Clause rights as a condition of getting a permit.”270 But under
this logic, when applying the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to
exactions, a critical weakness arises because the Takings Clause operates
differently than other constitutional provisions to which courts have
applied the doctrine.271
Assuming the “public use” requirement of the Takings Clause is met,
the clause does not prohibit the government from acquiring property.
Rather, it mandates that if a taking has occurred, the government must
compensate the landowner for that taking.272 In this sense, the term
“unconstitutional condition” is misleading. The condition is not
“unconstitutional” in the sense that it is totally prohibited; rather, the only
issue is whether the government pays for it.273 So the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine does not align with exactions takings law as it
logically does with other constitutional provisions, such as the right to
speech secured by the First Amendment.274
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine diverges from exactions law
in yet another fundamental way. If the government imposes an exaction
that transgresses the Nollan and Dolan boundaries, the landowner does
not forfeit any right to contest the taking by accepting the permit. As long
as she preserves the takings claim, the landowner can build under the
permit and concurrently seek compensation for the taking caused by the
exaction. That is precisely what the plaintiffs did in Nollan; they
proceeded to build their new house while prosecuting a claim that the
government had taken an easement on the property.275 In contrast, when
270. See Somin, supra note 9, at 240.
271. See Fennell & Peñalver, supra note 9, at 334 (“Substantive takings law contains a
unique feature: the payment of just compensation removes the constitutional infirmity associated
with an involuntary taking for public use. . . . The takings context thus differs from other contexts
in which parties may be asked to waive their constitutional rights in exchange for benefits.”).
272. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
273. Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998), recognizes
as much: “The [Takings] Clause operates as a conditional limitation, permitting the government
to do what it wants so long as it pays the charge.” Id. at 545 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment
and dissenting in part).
274. Margaret Tarkington, A First Amendment Theory for Protecting Attorney Speech, 45
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 27, 47 (2011).
275. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 829–30 (1987) (noting that while the
litigation was pending, the Nollans “satisfied the condition on their option to purchase by tearing
down the bungalow and building the new house”); see also Been, supra note 112, at 503 (“Some
developers have adopted the strategy of agreeing to an exaction in order to secure a permit,
building the development, then suing for a refund of the exaction (or as in Nollan, building the
development in violation of the permit requirement while litigating the issue).”). Of course, if the
permit explicitly required, as yet another condition, that the property owner “waive” any takings
claim about the exaction, that waiver would present different questions. One question would be
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courts apply the unconstitutional conditions doctrine in other situations,
the doctrine’s effect is generally to strike down the condition.276
In sum, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine and the extortion
narrative do share the common bond of responding to government
coercion. But the Court’s underdeveloped references to that doctrine and
its weaknesses when applied to exactions do not support the Court’s
effort to employ the doctrine as a vehicle for injecting the extortion
narrative into the substantive law of takings exactions.
C. Devaluing the Status of State and Local Officials
The extortion narrative markedly alters the relationship between the
courts and state and local governments. It presumes that local
governments act coercively toward project applicants and that the Court
must fashion takings law to prevent this coercion. The need is seen as
urgent. Thus, the Court in Koontz applied the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine even while admitting that no taking had occurred.277 The Court
also acknowledged that local government might not have even made the
demand required to invoke the doctrine.278 Even further, it was unclear
that a remedy existed for the violation.279
Moreover, in Dolan, the Court placed the burden of proof to uphold
the exaction on the city, with the unconvincing explanation that the city
was engaged in making an adjudicative decision.280 The burden in cases
whether, under state law, a local government has the power to impose such a waiver as a condition.
Further, as part of any takings claim, the landowner would argue that not only was the exaction a
taking, but the waiver was invalid as not truly consensual. However, permits rarely include such
waivers.
276. As others have argued, the “means–ends” test of Nollan and Dolan is likewise
disconnected from the economic impact of the regulation:
The Lingle Court confirmed that regulatory takings inquiries center on the
economic impact that a governmental action has upon an individual’s property
value. The exaction takings tests of Nollan and Dolan seemingly required
application of the very substantive analysis rejected in Lingle because exactions
that result in takings are invalid in the sense that they violate the means-ends
nexus and proportionality threshold. Nevertheless, Lingle perplexingly preserved
Nollan and Dolan’s tests in the “special context” of exactions.
Mulvaney, Proposed Exactions, supra note 150, at 304 n.146 (citation omitted).
277. See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2597 (2013) (“Where
the permit is denied and the condition is never imposed, nothing has been taken.”).
278. See id. at 2598 (“[W]e decline to reach respondent’s argument that its demands for
property were too indefinite to give rise to liability under Nollan and Dolan.”).
279. See id. at 2597 (“But we need not decide whether federal law authorizes plaintiffs to
recover damages for unconstitutional conditions claims predicated on the Takings Clause because
petitioner brought his claim under state law.”).
280. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 n.8 (1994).
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challenging local government action usually lies with the plaintiff.281
Finally, the rhetoric that the Court has deliberately used—“an out-andout plan of extortion”282—evidences a hostility to local government
actions that is inconsistent with any notion of deference.
The Court thus views itself as the last bulwark preventing injury to
landowners by abusive local governments. Absent Court action, local
governments will run amuck. This view, however, fundamentally alters
the Court’s past conception of the role that state and local governments
are to play both generally and in the land use field specifically.
Local elected officials make most of the important land use decisions.
Moreover, state law, passed by elected officials, empowers local elected
officials to act. The extortion narrative, then, necessarily assumes that
both sets of elected representatives are uniformly insensitive to the rights
of landowners. Under the narrative, local officials coerce landowners, and
state representatives have not intervened with new legislation designed to
prevent that coercion.
In contrast, the Court in other contexts has cited the ability of elected
officials to address a land use problem as an important factor in how the
Court approaches that problem. In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, Inc.,283 the Court refused to apply heightened scrutiny to a claim
of discrimination against a center for handicapped persons.284 Part of the
Court’s rationale was that those individuals had sufficient electoral power
to vindicate their rights through the legislative process.285
Here, the available evidence casts doubt upon the uniform assumption
of coercive intent by both state and local government officials. Certainly
the occupations of local elected officials do not appear to evidence an
overwhelming hostility to landowners; a large percentage of
representatives are business owners, managers, or professionals.286
Moreover, the evidence indicates that development interests are
281. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391 n.8 and text accompaning note 176.
282. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 387 (quoting Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837
(1987)).
283. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
284. Id. at 442.
285. Id. at 443 (“Second, the distinctive legislative response, both national and state, to the
plight of those who are mentally retarded demonstrates not only that they have unique problems,
but also that the lawmakers have been addressing their difficulties in a manner that belies a
continuing antipathy or prejudice and a corresponding need for more intrusive oversight by the
judiciary.”). The Court overturned the ordinance in this case on equal protection grounds without
treating the plaintiffs as a quasi-suspect class, as they requested. Id. at 442.
286. See JAMES H. SVARA, NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, TWO DECADES OF CONTINUITY AND
CHANGE IN AMERICAN CITY COUNCILS 8
(2003)
http://www.skidmore.edu/
~bturner/Svara%20citycouncilrpt.pdf. For example, two in five city council members have
professional or graduate degrees. Id. at 1, 8.
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substantially represented on local zoning boards.287 One would not expect
consistently extortionate behavior by this group toward development
proposals.288
The local planning staff is certainly influential in local land use
decisions, and perhaps they exhibit extortionate behavior and resist
infringements on local discretion. However, here too evidence exists that
planning agency staff members are not hostile to the Court’s exaction
decisions, at least before Koontz. A survey of planners found that almost
three-quarters of them agreed that Nollan and Dolan amounted to good
planning.289 This view hardly reflects the type of hostility that would
impel local planners to intentionally skirt the Court’s limits.
Further, if landowners were repeatedly subject to extortionate
demands by local governments, they logically would seek relief through
state legislation.290 Again, the political makeup of state legislatures and
the lobbying power of the real estate industry suggest that state
legislatures would be receptive to claims that greater regulation of
exactions is necessary to prevent extortionate overreaching.291 For
example, state legislatures moved quickly after the Court’s controversial
287. See Jerry L. Anderson, Aaron E. Brees & Emily C. Reninger, A Study of American
Zoning Board Composition and Public Attitudes Toward Zoning Issues, 40 URB. LAW. 689, 705
(2008) (finding that every member of the New York City Planning Commission “had some sort
of vested interest in the development process”); Jerry L. Anderson & Erin Sass, Is the Wheel
Unbalanced? A Study of Bias on Zoning Boards, 36 URB. LAW. 447, 450 (2004) (“[A]lthough
much depends on interpretation, we conclude that the majority of those sitting on zoning boards
stand to benefit, either directly or indirectly, from development.”).
288. See Richard Schragger, Consuming Government, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1824, 1832 n.21
(2003) (reviewing WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES
INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND USE POLICIES (2001))
(noting that, according to Professor Fischel, “the dominant literature asserts that local politics
tends to be driven by prodevelopment elites,” and citing some of the literature that supports this
theory). Professor Schragger suggests that homeowners may play a larger role in smaller
jurisdictions. Id. at 1832.
289. Ann E. Carlson & Daniel Pollak, Takings on the Ground: How the Supreme Court’s
Takings Jurisprudence Affects Local Land Use Decisions, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 103, 142 (2001).
290. See generally Fenster, Regulating Land Use, supra note 118, at 759 (discussing an
“institutional web of local authority and restraint—including decisions made by state and local
institutions, as well as by private individuals—that operates alongside the Court’s formalist
rules”).
291. The National Association of Home Builders is a large and active lobbyist at the federal
level. BuilderLink, NAT’L ASS’N OF HOME BUILDERS, http://www.nahb.org/en/advocate/
builderlink.aspx (last visited Aug. 30, 2015). At the state level, many states have active home
builders associations that lobby. One example is the Home Builders Association of Virginia,
whose website states that it has been found to be one of the top five “most effective” lobbying
groups in the state and lists the imposition of fees as a major issue about which it is concerned.
About HBAV, HOME BUILDERS ASS’N OF VA., http://www.hbav.com/about-hbav/ (last visited Aug.
30, 2015).
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decision in Kelo v. City of New London,292 where the Court upheld local
government actions that took private property and transferred it to other
private entities.293 They passed a barrage of new laws aimed, in one
fashion or another, at limiting local governments’ ability to take such
action or adopting procedures to regulate that action.294
One rebuttal to this idea that a political correction mechanism exists
for “extortionate” takings might be that the idea over-generalizes the
parties who are subject to extortionate behavior by local governments.
The argument would be that individual landowners often bear the brunt
of extortionate exactions, and they do not have the same political power
to voice their interests at the state level as larger development interest
groups. But the interests of individual landowners are unlikely to differ
fundamentally from those of larger development interest groups who are
subject to the same laws and who, unquestionably, do have the political
clout to make themselves heard.
If the Court’s assumption of helplessness on the part of development
interest groups is not accurate, then the question becomes why state
legislatures are not adopting legislation that would prevent the type of
behavior that the Court sees as extortionate. A strong possibility is simply
that legislatures do not perceive the behavior of local governments to be
as unfair and coercive as the Court does. If so, then the Court’s insistence
on prophylactic protection for landowners against “extorted” conditions
takes on antidemocratic overtones, with the Court substituting its own
subjective view of the appropriate scope of regulatory authority for those
of elected officials.295
At the same time, the Court has become less interested in how the state
courts are applying takings law. While interpretation of the Fifth
Amendment is, of course, a question of federal constitutional law, the
Takings Clause particularly affects state and local governments because
they are primarily in charge of land use regulation. Additionally, local

292. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
293. Id. at 485–86.
294. See, e.g., Marc Mihaly & Turner Smith, Kelo’s Trail: A Survey of State and Federal
Legislative and Judicial Activity Five Years Later, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 703, 708 (2011) (“The
property rights movement gained significant traction after Kelo, leading some states to tighten
their eminent domain laws to eliminate economic development as a viable ‘public use’ and to
limit ‘blight’ condemnations under state takings clauses.”). But see Shaun Hoting, The Kelo
Revolution, 86 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 65, 128 (2009) (“[M]any of these statutes have either failed
to close loopholes or opened new loopholes that will allow continued abuses of eminent domain
powers.”).
295. Others have noted the anti-democratic tendencies of recent takings decisions. See
Andrew W. Schwartz, Reciprocity of Advantage: The Antidote to the Antidemocratic Trend in
Regulatory Takings, 22 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 15 (2003/2004).
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authority to regulate largely derives from state legislation.296
As a result, state courts have longstanding and extensive experience
adjudicating takings challenges. During the first three quarters of the
twentieth century, the U.S. Supreme Court issued few opinions
interpreting the Fifth Amendment, leaving most of that work to the state
courts.297 Indeed, the idea of land use “extortion” through conditions
originated in a state decision. In Nollan, when the Court first held that a
permit condition lacking a nexus to a project’s impact would constitute
“an out-and-out plan of extortion,”298 it principally cited a New
Hampshire Supreme Court decision, J.E.D. Associates, Inc. v.
Atkinson.299 In that case, a town had adopted a regulation requiring all
developers to dedicate “land of a character suitable for playgrounds or
other town use” that equaled approximately seven-and-one-half percent
of a subdivision’s total acreage.300
The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that the dedication
requirement “appears to us to be an out-and-out plan of extortion”
requiring developers to pay for the privilege of using their land.301 The
town had not even attempted to connect the dedication requirement to any
specific impacts of the project.302 In Koontz, however, the Court cited no
296. John R. Nolon, In Praise of Parochialism: The Advent of Local Environmental Law, 23
PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 705, 719 (2006) (“In most states, it is understood that municipalities have
no inherent powers, but can exercise only that authority expressly granted or necessarily implied
from, or incident to, the powers expressly granted by the state.”).
297. See supra Section I.A.
298. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 839, 825 (1987) (quoting J.E.D. Assocs., Inc.
v. Town of Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14 (N.H. 1981)).
299. 432 A.2d 12, 14–15 (1981). The Supreme Court also used “see” citations directing
readers to the Brief of the United States as amicus curiae and the Court’s decision in Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982), which rebutted a Teleprompter
argument about how a landlord could avoid the requirements of the New York City law, neither
of which sheds light on the extortion idea. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
300. J.E.D. Assocs., 432 A.2d at 13.
301. Id. at 14. The Court later stated that municipal officials “may not attempt to extort from
a citizen a surrender of his right to just compensation for any part of his property that is taken
from him for public use as a price for permission to exercise his right to put his property to
whatever legitimate use he desires subject only to reasonable regulation.” Id. at 15.
302. See id. The New Hampshire Supreme Court distinguished one of its earlier opinions in
which it had upheld a condition requiring that part of a subdivision be left as unimproved open
space. Patenaude v. Town of Meredith, 392 A.2d 582, 586 (N.H. 1978). In that situation, the court
said that the requirement “was based on a specific need related to the nature of that development
and unlike the regulation now before us, was not an arbitrary blanket requirement.” J.E.D. Assocs.,
432 A.2d at 15. The Dolan decision, too, relied on various state court decisions about the
appropriate test to establish the relationship between a condition and an impact. The rough
proportionality test purported to be a middle ground between state tests that were more stringent
or weaker. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994). But see Matthew J. Cholewa
& Helen L. Edmonds, Federalism and Land Use After Dolan: Has the Supreme Court Taken

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016

49

Florida Law Review, Vol. 68, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 6

372

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

state decisions in support of its holding; instead, the Court relied on its
assumptions about extortion as the primary basis for the holding.303
Moreover, some members of the Court have suggested that state courts
are not following its decisions in this area.304
The point here is not that the Court must rely on state court decisions
to bolster the reasoning in its opinions. Rather, what is striking is that as
the Court proceeded to develop its exaction jurisprudence, it began by
relying on and closely considering state law decisions and then departed
in Koontz from that practice. At the same time, the Court adopted the
extortion narrative with its overt hostility to and distrust of local decision
makers and its implied dismissal of state legislators as the primary
correctors of local overreaching.
To sum up, the extortion narrative at its core assumes a power
imbalance between municipal governments and development interests,
and in response posits the need for the Court to shape prophylactic rules
as a corrective device.305 State legislation might correct the imbalance,
but the Court has taken no notice either of such legislation or its
absence—situations that might lead a court to question the correctness of
its assumption underlying the extortion narrative. In short, the Court has
blazed its own path in forging the extortion narrative and, in doing so, has
abandoned its traditional respect for the institutional sphere of state and
local government.
D. Textual Failure and Structural Inconsistency
In the end, the Court’s development of exactions law must comport
with the actual language of the Takings Clause. At the same time,
exactions law must relate structurally to those other constitutional
provisions, particularly the Due Process Clause, that are available to
constrain local land use discretion exercised in an extortionate manner.
In adopting the extortion narrative, the Court has failed here as well.
A fundamental problem arises from the focus of the Takings Clause
on compensation. The clause establishes a dividing line that, when
crossed by the government to secure property for a public use, requires

Takings from the States?, 28 URB. LAW. 401, 415–16 (1996) (arguing that Dolan misread many
state court decisions).
303. See supra Section I.C.
304. See Ronald H. Rosenberg, The Non-impact of the United States Supreme Court
Regulatory Takings Cases on the State Courts: Does the Supreme Court Really Matter?, 6
FORDHAM ENVTL L.J. 523, 555–56 (1995).
305. See Mulvaney, Remnants of Exaction Takings, supra note 108, at 196–97 (stating that
“[f]or the majorities in Nollan and Dolan, the regulatory takings doctrine became a corrective
device to balance against incentives for abuse of state permitting power”).
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payment of “just compensation.”306 The clause does not, as the Court has
emphasized, impose substantive limitations on land use regulation other
than the “public use” requirement.307
By contrast, the extortion narrative, as implemented through the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine, serves a different purpose: ensuring
that individuals are not coerced into surrendering rights.308 That purpose
does not align well with the actual language and function of the Takings
Clause. The Court’s awkward linguistic attempt to fuse extortion with
takings—prohibiting governments from “impermissibly burden[ing] the
right not to have property taken without just compensation”309—only
serves to illustrate the mismatch. Not surprisingly, this language lacks the
expository power that could explain and justify such an important judicial
restraint on local government power.
Thus, as explicated in Koontz, the extortion doctrine focuses on
“impermissibly burden[ing]” rights310 and strays quite a distance from the
actual language of the Fifth Amendment. The Court was forced to
recognize as much by concluding that no actual taking occurred in that
case.311 Instead, to avoid a potential unconstitutional condition, Koontz
now authorizes courts to police negotiations that precede any actual
regulatory action by local governments.312 Moreover, no obvious
stopping point for that oversight exists from the standpoint of the
extortion narrative. One can now conceive of charges that the very
breadth of the negotiations was extortionate, even if the local government
did not actually demand that the developer acquiesce to any conditions.
The question is not what was taken; it is what could have been taken.
Further, the Court now has fully linked its exactions jurisprudence to
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. But that doctrine also is nowhere
reflected in the text of the Constitution. In implementing the extortion
narrative, then, the Court has likewise distanced itself from the actual
language of the Fifth Amendment.
The Court’s departure from the constitutional text also renders suspect
its discussion in Koontz of the remedy for a violation of the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine. First, it found that extortionate
306. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
307. Id. (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”).
308. See supra Section III.B.
309. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2596 (2013); see also
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 315 (1986)
(drawing the distinction between interference and just compensation for takings).
310. 133 S. Ct. at 2596 (“Extortionate demands for property in the land-use permitting
context run afoul of the Takings Clause not because they take property but because they
impermissibly burden the right not to have property taken without just compensation.”).
311. Id. at 2597.
312. See supra Section I.C.
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demands can “run afoul” of the Takings Clause313 but later concluded that
no taking occurred.314 The Court ended up citing the Takings Clause as
the source of a potential prophylactic measure to prevent takings, yet that
clause cannot supply the measure of any remedy because no taking
actually occurred.315
The remedy, therefore, must originate elsewhere, but here the Court
scurried to distance itself from the problem. It first explained that “[i]n
cases where there is an excessive demand but no taking, whether money
damages are available is not a question of federal constitutional law.”316
Rather, it depends on the cause of action, whether state or federal, on
which the landowner relies.317 The Koontz Court then opted out of the
issue, concluding that because the petitioner brought his claim pursuant
to state law, the Court “ha[d] no occasion to discuss what remedies might
be available for a Nollan/Dolan unconstitutional conditions violation
either here or in other cases.”318 And the Court later reinforced the point,
finding that it did not need to “decide whether federal law authorizes
plaintiffs to recover damages for unconstitutional conditions claims
predicated on the Takings Clause.”319
This reasoning is puzzling. The Court refused to address the remedy
because it is a state law issue, leaving one to wonder why the Court would
address a constitutional claim that might have no remedy under state law.
Indeed, Justice Elena Kagan’s dissent suggests strongly suggests that no
such remedy existed under Florida law absent an actual taking.320
That leaves a potential federal remedy for the unconstitutional
conditions violation. The remedy might be to strike the unconstitutional
condition that burdened the benefit.321 How that would work in a case
such as Koontz is unclear because the local government never actually
313. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2596.
314. Id. at 2597.
315. Id. at 2603.
316. Id. at 2597.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2612 (Kagan, J.,
dissenting) (“Certainly, none of the Florida courts in this case suggested that the majority’s
hypothesized remedy actually exists.”). The Supreme Court had been down a similar road before.
See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 306–07
(1987) (holding that the remedy for a taking was damages, even though it was not clear that any
taking had occurred). On remand, the California appeals court found that no taking had occurred
in the case. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 258 Cal. Rptr.
893, 893 (Ct. App. 1989).
321. See, e.g., Memorial Hosp. v Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 269 (1974) (finding
unconstitutional a statute that established a durational residence requirement for eligibility for
nonemergency free medical care).
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imposed any conditions but instead disapproved the project.322 Perhaps
the Court could find that the local government was somehow obligated
to approve the project without the objectionable condition, a form of
injunctive relief. Mandatory injunctive relief of this type would seem
rare, not to mention difficult to formulate. Also the remedy would put
federal courts deep in the thicket of local land use law.
In short, the Takings Clause on its face is a remedial measure designed
to compensate for a taking. Turning the clause into a prospective
protective measure against extortionate demands immediately leads to
uncertainty about both the availability and source of a remedy for a
violation.
In terms of constitutional structure, the principal difficulty is that, at
its core, the extortion narrative centers on abuse of discretion. The
concern is that land use agencies will act in a rent-seeking manner by
imposing excessive burdens on landowners. But determining whether a
land use agency has abused its discretion by acting arbitrarily in this
fashion is traditionally a function of the Due Process Clause, not the
Takings Clause.323 The Court’s use of the extortion narrative thus skews
the relationship between the Takings and Due Process Clauses. That
result is particularly ironic because the Court as recently as 2005 in Lingle
took pains to set forth the appropriate relationship between those
clauses.324
In sum, as fully explicated in Koontz, the extortion narrative departs
entirely from the actual language of the Takings Clause and distorts that
clause’s relationship with the Due Process Clause. Nothing, of course,
prevents a five-member majority of the Court from continuing to redefine
takings law in this fashion. But such further expansion will lack both
textual justification in the Fifth Amendment and legitimacy in
constitutional structure.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s recent cases on exaction takings, particularly
the 2013 Koontz decision, have shown that the Court’s language
322. See supra Section III.B.
323. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 542 (2005) (noting that a means–end
test “has some logic in the context of a due process challenge, for a regulation that fails to serve
any legitimate governmental objective may be so arbitrary or irrational that it runs afoul of the
Due Process Clause”); see also Siegel, supra note 253, at 586 (stating, in discussing Lingle, that
a “regulation’s validity” is a due process question “as opposed to the pivotal regulatory takings
question: whether a regulation is ‘functionally comparable to government appropriation or
invasion of private property’” (citation omitted) (quoting Lingle, 544 U.S. at 542)).
324. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 542 (explaining that the “means–ends test” for substantive due
process “is not a valid method of discerning whether private property has been ‘taken’ for
purposes of the Fifth Amendment”).
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regarding extortion amounts to far more than just hyperbole. A majority
of the Court has endorsed the extortion narrative, and it increasingly
animates the Court’s holdings. The Court’s references to “extortion”
cannot be dismissed as vivid surplusage; instead, they demand scrutiny.
The extortion theme has, for example, caused the Court to veer
unpredictably in explaining the structure of takings law. Thus, in City of
Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.,325 the Court declared
that Dolan’s test for dedications “was not designed to address” the
situation of a denial of development.326 But with the ascendancy of the
extortion narrative in Koontz, the Court reversed course.
When one examines the extortion narrative and its implementation in
the Court’s cases, the flaws in the narrative become apparent. If the Court
continues to rely upon it, exactions takings law will rest on an
unconvincing and unsustainable foundation.

325. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687 (1999).
326. Id. at 703.
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